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C~PTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary focus of this study ls centered upon the highly ln• 
volved, extreme attitude person. Political or racial extremists are 
not exclusive representatives of the highly involved, extreme attitude 
person. Any subject who ls personally conmitted to an attitude posi-
tion which ls extreme, relative to those around him, may be considered 
a highly involved, extreme attitude person. Additionally, a given per• 
son may be highly committed to an extreme attitude position along one 
dimension, yet non-involved with regard to a different attitude dlmen• 
sion. For example, on a particular attitude dimension, such as chasti• 
ty•promiscuity, a father may be highly corrmitted to an extreme attitude 
position, relative to the attitude position of his daughter and her peer 
group. Depending upon the attitude domain, most people may be described 
as a highly involved, extreme attitude person. 
It is the purpose of this study to investigate how the judgment of 
a highly involved, extreme attitude person differs from the judgment of 
a less involved, moderate attitude person, when both are responding to 
the same attitude dimension. Of special interest ls how well each type 
of subject ls able to make distinctions among personally rejected atti• 
tude positions. A second interest ls whether there ts a difference be• 
tween the two kinda of subjects in the level of objection attributed to 
rejected attitude positions. 
The assimilation-contr~st model of social judgment (Sherif & 
Sherif, 1969) provided the framework within which these issues were 
studied. 
Review of the Literature 
Transposition of the Assimilation-Contrast Hypothesis from Psycho• 
physical to Psychosocial Research 
The following literature review attempts to focus on the develop• 
merit of major concepts comprising the assimilation-contrast model of 
social judgment and the operational syntax relating these concepts to-
gether. 
Early experimentation (Wever & Zener, 1929; Volkman, 1936;. 
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Tresselt, 1947, 1948) developed some of the fundamental outlines of 
assimilation-contrast phenomena as it pertained to psychophysical judg• 
ments of weight, color, etc. 
In Volkman•s (1951) psychophysical studies at Mt. Holyoke College, 
he stressed that assimilation-contrast effects were a function of stimu-
lus discrepancy from an "anchor" point. Through practice and experi• 
ence with a stimulus domain, subjects tended to adopt a standard or 
anchor stimulus that served as a reference point about which relative 
comparisons of other stimuli in the same domain could be made. The 
occurrence of either assimilation or contrast effects was shown to be a 
function of stimulus discrepancy from the adopted standard or anchor 
stimulus (Hinckly & Rethlingshafer, 1951). 
The assimilation-contrast hypothesis generally proposed that all 
judgments were made with respect to a frame of reference. When a sub· 
ject has adopted a standard, or anchor category, other stimuli within 
the same dimension are assu~ed to acquire meaning and value relative to 
the adopted anchor position. Given a continuum of stimulus events, 
assimilation effects are said to occur when a subject locates a stimu• 
lus event in a category somewhere between his adopted anchor category 
and the category into which the stimulus event would have been located 
by observers not affected by the adopted standard. Contrast effects 
are said to occur when a subject locates a target stimulus within a 
category further away from his adopted anchor category than would be 
indicated by observers or measurements not affected by the adopted 
standard (Peak, 1958). 
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The transposition of psychophysical research findings into hypo• 
theses pertaining to social judgment was a logical step. The analogy 
was simple. The adopted anchor stimuli (Volkman, 1951) was equated 
with one's own attitude position on a social issue. The psychophysical 
scale of stimuli (weights) was simulated by a psychosocial scale of 
attitude statements reliably ranked by a pool of judges to represent a 
more or less continuous stimulus dimension. 
As it were, the initial studies applying the assimilation-contrast 
hypotheses to social judgment dealt primarily with the extent of dis• 
crepancy between a subject's adopted anchor and the social stimuli to be 
judged. 
It would seem that one of the first efforts to utilize the asslmi• 
lation-contrast hypothesis to interpret data obtained in a social judg• 
ment study was that of Sherif & Hovland (1953). 
At the time of Sherif & Hovland's 1953 study, Thurstone's (1929) 
procedure for deriving equal-appearing interval scale excluded judges 
who held extreme attitudes toward the stimulus domain, since their 
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judgments could not be considered as contributing to an objective 
scale. Contrary to this practice, Sherif & Hovland (1953) investigated 
the scaling of statements by using "highly involved" subjects advocating 
extreme attitude positions relative to a given stimulus do~ain, as well 
as using "moderately involved" subjects subscribing to moderate attitude 
positions. 
Two different methods of scaling were applied to the same set of 
114 statements which ranged from very pro-Negro to very anti-Negro. 
The 114 statements were categorized by the standard Thurstone procedure 
which used 11 imposed categories; then two weeks later the same state-
ments were categorized by allowing subjects to place statements into 
piles which "go together." In this latter procedure, judges need not 
distribute statements into 11 categories, but may use any number of 
11piles" or categories that arrange the continuum of stimuli into per-
sonally meaningful groups that seem to "go together." The order in 
which statements were categorized by the above two procedures was 
counter-balanced to avoid order effects. 
The results of this comparison indicated that the less involved, 
moderate pro-Negro subjects categorized the 114 statements into about 
five self-selected categories; and the number of statements placed 
in each of the five categories was as evenly distributed as in the Thur-
stone scale of 11 imposed categories. 
Highly involved, pro-Negro judges (the first Negro students to 
attend a previously all-white university) employed four or fewer cate-
gories in order to subdivide the 114 statements into "piles that go 
together." On the average, highly involved, pro-Negro judges placed 65 
of the 114 statements into "piles" later determined to be "objection• 
able," while only 27 statements were placed into "piles•1 later deter-
mined to be "acceptable." This was quite a different pattern of judg· 
ment compared to less ego-involved; "moderatett attitude subjects (an 
unselected group of white students) who placed 38 and 43 statements 
into "piles" later indicated to be "objectionablett and "acceptable," 
respectively. 
A general conclusion drawn from this study was that persons who 
differ in both degree of personal involvement and extremity of attitude 
position, seemed to use different reference scales to categorize a 
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given social stimulus domain. Compared to judges adopting a "moderate" 
anchor category, pro-Negro subjects adopting an extreme anchor category 
judged a disproportionately greater number of statements to be object• 
tionable. This phenomenon was interpreted as contrast effects exhibited 
by pro-Negro judges. This interpretation was offered since pro-Negro 
subjects placed intermediate statements into piles further away from the 
extreme pro-Negro position than judges not adopting the extreme stand• 
ard, in this case "moderate" attitude judges. 
Shortly after the above study was completed, Sherif, Harvey & 
Hovland (1957) conducted a landmark study that more clearly demonstrated 
the transposition of assimilation-contrast principles from psychophysi-
cal to psychosocial problems. 
Around the middle 1950's, laboratory studies investigating opin• 
ion change tended to support the hypothesis that the greater the amount 
of opinion change advocate~ by a connnunicatlon, the greater the average 
amount of opinion change produced in a subject (Goldberg, 1954; French, 
1956; Fisher & Lieben, 1958). These findings, according to Sherif, 
Harvey & Hovland, (1957), were not in line with their hunches as to what 
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would happen in a naturalistic field study dealing with important social 
issues. Their dissatisfaction with laboratory studies rested on the 
frequent observation that experimen.tal subjects were captive audiences 
left without their usual methods of selective exposure (Klapper, 1949), 
and that laboratory subjects were being persuaded to change opinions on 
issues of little personal importance to them. 
In contrast to laboratory studies, and their claimed artificial-
ity, Hovland, Harvey & Sherif (1957) chose the prohibition issue, which 
at the time was a hotly debated topic in Oklahoma and Texas. Religious 
groups following a Fundamentalist orientation declaring total absti• 
nence (dry) vehemently countered the arguments propounded by groups of 
businessmen, politicians, and lawyers receiving financial support from 
distillers (wet). The authors of this study were interested in how 
subjects sampled from these antagonistic factions would interpret three 
communications, one strongly wet, one strongly dry, and one moderately 
wet. 
Results demonstrated that "dry" subjects judged the "moderately 
wet•• statement as "very wet" (contrast). "Very wet" subjects judged 
the "moderately wet" statement as "dry" (contrast). Subjects upholding 
positions near, but not identical to that represented by the "moderate• 
ly wet" statement judged it to be more like their own position than was 
the case (assimilation). 
The general findings suggest that a subject whose attitude posi-
tion was relatively close to a communication tended to judge that com-
munication position to be more like.his own attitude position than was 
the case (assimilation effect). Subjects with more discrepant positions 
relative to a given communication judged the communication to be more 
extreme and further away from their own attitude position than was the 
case (contrast effect). 
At this stage of development,·assimllation-contrast effects were 
being studied as a function of discrepancy or distance between communi• 
cation and subject attitude positions. This focus closely paralleled 
earlier psychophysical experiments which found assimilation-contrast 
effects to be a function of the difference between the adopted anchor 
stimuli and the target stimulus to be judged, e.g., the judgment of 
weights (Tresselt, 1947, 1948). 
A second influence in Sherif, Harvey & Hovland's work can be seen 
emanating from an early Gestalt proposition (Koffka, 1935) that ·the 
judgment of any object is always made with reference to other objects 
in the stimulus field, and that within a _given field, separate stimuli 
bear a membership character to the configural gestalt. 
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The more complex study of social judgment conducted by Hovland, 
Harvey & Sherif (1957) seemed to contain and extend concepts germinating 
from both psychophysical research and gestalt theory. The explicit 
meaning of assimilation-contrast effects in the area of social judgment 
was, in principle, analogous to that demonstrated by earlier psychophy• 
steal studies. The judgment of a "moderately wet" statement as "ex· 
tremely wet11 by a subject whose own attitude position was "dry," was 
analogous to the judgment of a 50-gram weight as weighing 70 grams by a 
subject adopting a 30-gram anchor or standard. In this respect, 
Sherif, Harvey & Hovland's (1957) study seemed to represent a rather 
direct and successful transposition· of psychophysical conclusions into 
a social judgment framework. 
Latitude Patterns as a Function of Attitude Position and/ or Level of 
Ego-Involvement 
In the early 1960's a number of studies provided considerable 
syntactic and conceptual elaboration to the developing assimilation-
contrast model as applied to social judgment. Focus on major develop-
ments is found in the 1960 United States Presidential elec.tion study 
reported by Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall (1965). 
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Data for this study were obtained from more than 1,500 persons 
just before the election, which enhanced the prospect of high personal 
involvement in the election issue. Nine political statements that were 
reliably ranked on a bipolar continuum from extremely Republican (Posi• 
tion A) to extremely Democratic (Position I) served as the psychosocial 
scale. A subject was simply asked to indicate which statement was 
"most acceptable11 to him; this particular statement operationally de• 
fined a subject's "own attitude position" or anchor category. Next, 
subjects were. asked to mark any other "acceptable" state~ents. The 
combination of "most acceptable•• and other "acceptable" statements op-
erationally defined a subject's "latitude of acceptance. 11 Next, the 
subject was asked to indicate that statement considered to be "most ob• 
jectionable" and then to identify any other "objectionable" statements. 
The combination of 11most objectionable" and other "objectionable" 
statements defined a subject's "latitude of rejection." Those state-
ments not indicated by a subject as acceptable nor objectionable, op-
erationally defined a subject's "latitude of noncommitment." 
Rationale for this measurement procedure grew out of the authors' 
dissatisfaction with the then current practice of assigning a single 
numerical value to summarize a subject's attitude toward a continuum of 
social events. Latitudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection 
were employed to get at the comparative evaluations of a register of 
stimulus events belonging to an attitude dimension. This was asserted 
to be more informative and less artificial than a single point score. 
The core findings demonstrated that as the "own position" became 
increasingly extreme, the latitude of acceptance narrowed slightly, the 
latitude of noncomrttitment approached a zero value, and the latitude of 
rejection became disproportionately large. 
This was the pattern regardless of whether the "own position" was 
in a Democrat or Republican direction. A symmetrical, mirror image ex-
isted between "own positions" equally extreme from the midpoint of the 
political scale. 
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Current thought supported by research reviews (Cantril, 1946; 
Allport, 1943) suggested that persons upholding extreme positions were 
more ego-involved with, or committed to their attitude position than 
persons subscribing to more rooderate attitude positions, relative to a 
given attitude dimension. Given this assumption, certain equivalencies 
were argued, tested and confirmed. If it could be argued that "ex-
treme" Republicans or Democrats were more ego-involved in their posi• 
tion than subjects subscribing to more moderate political positions, 
then high-ego-involvement was associated with a disproportionately 
large latitude of rejection relative to the latitude of acceptance, and 
a latitude of noncommitment that approached a zero value. Correspond-
ingly, subjects espousing a moderate attitude position and therefore 
argued to be less ego-involved exhibited latitudes of acceptance, non-
commitment, and rejection of approximately equal size. These were the 
main characteristics of groups of subjects as a function of extremity 
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of attitude position. 
However, tests of variability indicated that groups of subjects 
representing all positions except E, the mid-position, exhibited similar 
variability. Greater individual differences in latitude patterns were 
exhibited by the group of subjects indicating position E as their "most 
acceptable" choice of political statements. A detailed inspection of 
this group revealed that some subjects holding a "moderate" attitude 
position exhibited latitude patterns ascribed to high-ego-involved sub• 
jects. This argument followed that some subjects subscribing to a "mod· 
erate" attitude position did so with a high degree of personal commit• 
ment. Conversely, .a comparatively few number_ of subjects holding "ex• 
treme" attitude positions exhibited.latitude patterns associated with 
low-ego-involvement. The interpretation of these data finally resulted 
in the conclusion, or hypothesis, that level of ego-involvement was 
better defined by latitude characteristics, than by "extremity" of 
attitude position. It encompassed the comparatively rare case of sub• 
jects highly committed to a "moderate" attitude position, and, it en-
compassed the even rarer event of a subject "moderately committed" to an 
••extreme" attitude position, while simultaneously taking cognizance of 
that literature indicating a reliable correspondence between high-ego• 
involvement and extreme attitude position. 
Considerable support has been gathered for this interpretation. 
In a study by Tittler (1967), the size of the latitude of noncommitment 
was successfully used as an index of ego-involvement. Briefly, student 
subjects ranked a series of issues ·according to personal importance. It 
was found that the latitude of noncommitment was smallest for the most 
important issues and largest for the least important issues. Further~ 
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more, attempts to change student attitudes were significantly more suc-
cessful when the student's latitude of noncommitment was large, than 
when it was comparatively small. Larimer (1966) also found that a sig• 
nificantly greater attitude change could be effected in subjects exhi-
biting large latitudes of acceptance and noncomrnitment compared with 
subjects defined as having small latitudes of acceptance and noncommit• 
ment. 
The general findings of those studies relating level of ego-
involvement and latitude patterns consistently indicate that the rela• 
tive sizes of the latitudes of noncommitment and rejection served as re-
liable indices of ego-involvement level, rega_rdless of the extremity of 
the "own position" (Elbing, 1962; Beck & Nebergall, 1967; Miller, 1965; 
Diab, 1967). High ego-involvement was found to be reliably related to a 
disproportionately large latitude of rejection and a latitude of noncom• 
mltment which approached a zero value. 
Assimilation-Contrast Effects as a Joint Function of Degree of Ego• 
Involvement, Latitude Patterns, and Extent of Discrepancy 
There was one other relationship coming out of the 1960 presiden-
tial election study which claims a focal position within the developing 
assimilation-contrast model. Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall attempted to 
relate the latitude of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection to the 
phenomenon of assimilation-contrast effects. This attempt refined the 
variable, "extent of discrepancy," and its relationship to the occur-
rence of assimilation-contrast effects. On a bipolar attitude scale, 
the difference between a subject's own position and the position of a 
given attitude statement was redefined in terms of a subject's own lati-
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tudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection. 
Subjects were presented a taped recording of two communications, 
a mildly pro-Democrat communication representing position F and a mildly 
pro-Republican communication representing position D. These two state-
ments were presented by themselves, out of the total context of the 
nine-statement political scale. Subjects were asked to identify the 
political position represented by each of the two communications. Sub• 
jects indicated their judgments on a nine-centimeter scale designated as 
extremely Republican and extremely Democrat at either end. 
After this task was completed, subjects were administered the en-
tire nine-statement political scale. The ttown position," as well as the 
latitudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection were obtained for 
each subject. That statement designated as "most acceptable" by a sub• 
ject indexed the extremity of his attitude position. Level of involve-
ment with the "own position" was singularly defined by the size of a 
subject's latitude of rejection. With these two indices, extremity of 
attitude position and level of involvement could be separately indexed 
for each subject. 
A priori, it was hypothesized that any communication falling with-
in a person's own latitude of acceptance would be assimilated toward the 
"most acceptable" position; and any communication outside of a subject's 
latitude of acceptance would be contrasted away from the "most accept• 
able" position. A qualification of this hypothesis was also predicted. 
The magnitude of the predicted assimilation-contrast effects were ex-
pected to be greater for high-ego-involved, extreme attitude position 
subjects. 
The results of this phase of study confirmed the above hypotheses. 
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Extreme Democrats who were highly ego-involved judged the mildly Repub• 
lican communication as representing a more extreme Republican view than 
did the subjects who were themselves Republicans. To the contrary, the 
highly ego-involved, extreme Republican subjects significantly displaced 
the moderate Republican statement away from their own position and in a 
more Democratic direction. The same, identical pattern was found for 
the judgment of the mildly Democratic communication, but appropriately 
reversed. Extreme Democrats and extreme Republicans who were highly in-
volved exhibited marked contrast effects on both communications, since 
neither moderate communication was acceptable to their own extreme and 
highly invested position. 
For less involved subjects the sharp assimilation-contrast effects 
were not demonstrated. However, there was a non-significant trend for 
all low-involved subjects to assimilate the "moderate" communications. 
An important generalization developed out of this phase of the 
1960 presidential election study. Assimilation-contrast effects were a 
joint function of "extent of discrepancy" between a subject's own posi-
tion and the position represented by a social stimulus, and the degree 
of ego-involvement with the person's own position. Essentially, the 
occurrence of assimilation-contrast effects could be better predicted 
by describing "extent of discrepancy" in terms of the latitude of ac• 
ceptance, and by stipulating level of involvement in terms of the lati• 
tude of rejection. Pointedly, if the extent of discrepancy is contained 
within a subject's latitude of acceptance, then assimilation effects 
are clearly predictable for both high and low-involved subjects. If the 
extent of discrepancy locates the stimulus event outside of the latitude 
of acceptance, then for highly ego-involved subjects (comparatively 
large latitude of rejection) contrast effects are clearly predicted. 
However, for less ego-involved subjects (comparatively small latitudes 
of rejection) a nonsignificant tendency to assimilate stimulus events 
just outside of the latitude of acceptance was found. 
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Toward the latter half of the 1960's an increasing number of 
studies appeared that manipulated the above subsystem of relationships 
in different ways by applying them to different problems, thus stimula-
ting further development and articulation of the assimilation-contrast 
model of social judgment. 
Number of Categories as an Index of Ego-Involvement 
The question is posed as to whether subjects than can be defined 
as highly ego-involved, relative to a given stimulus domain, would con-
tinue to use a characteristic number of self-selected categories to 
categorize a scale of stimuli that was not important to them. 
A study by Glixman (1965) partially satisfies this query. Pro-
cedurally, Glixman had one sample of college subjects sort three dif-
ferent sets of materials assumed to be associated with different 
levels of personal importance. Each subject sorted a pile of familiar 
objects (chalk, paper clips, etc.), a set of statements on nuclear war, 
and a set of descriptive statements referring to themselves. 
The Null hypothesis stated that the number of categories used to 
categorize a stimulus domain is not associated with the importance of 
the content being categorized. 
Results showed a significant difference between the number of 
categories used to sort the low-important domain of material objects 
and the number of categories used to sort statements about nuclear 
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war, and, self-descriptions. The difference between number of cate• 
gories used to categorize nuclear war and self-description statements 
did not reach significance, which may have been due to both issues com-
manding nearly equal levels of personal involvement. However, the dis• 
tribution of self-descriptions was highly skewed. 
It was concluded that the findings could not be accounted for by 
characteristic "response style" without regard for the personal import-
ance of the content, and attitudes toward the content. 
Using a somewhat different format, Reich & Sherif (1963) compared 
the way mature women (age 35 to 50) categorized 60 statements dealing 
with legislative reapportionment. Fifteen of the 60 statements were 
extremely pro and fifteen were extremely anti-reapportionment. The re-
maining 30 statements were pre-tested for_high variability in terms of 
pro or con support of reapportionment. 
As opposed to Glixman's study, rather than three stimulus domains 
of varying assumed importance presented to a single unselected popula-
tion, Reich & Sherif's study used only one stimulus domain presented to 
two groups, each operationally defined as representing different levels 
of ego-involvement, relative to the test domain. One group consisted of 
active members of the League of Women Voters which had dedicated itself 
that year to the study of legislative reapportionment. The explicit 
assumption was that this group should be highly ego-involved along 
this attitude dimension compared to a matched sample of female school 
teachers favorable toward reapportionment but relatively uninvolved and 
inactive in the issue. 
Presumably, League members should have acquired a broader aware• 
ness of reapportionment problems and have a more differentiated appre-
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elation of them which would exhibit itself through a finely differen-
tiated process of categorization. However, 74 percent of the highly 
involved group used four or fewer categories for the 60 statements 
while only 26 percent of the teachers used such a small number of cate-
gories (p ~ .01). 
Vaughan (1961) conducted a study in which a group of ttanti•Latin" 
Texans and a group of ttuninvolved" Texans categorized a large pool of 
attitude statements dealing with a Mexican-American racial issue. 85 
percent of the anti-Latin group used three or less categories, while 
92 percent of the uninvolved group used four or more categories to or-
ganize the statements. 
LaFave & Sherif (1968) hypothesized that high-ego-involved sub· 
jects would use fewer categories than moderately ego-involved subjects, 
who in turn would use fewer categories than low-ego-involved subjects to 
organize a scale of attitude statements. 
Twenty-five slips of paper with written statements reliably ranked 
from "Very Segregationist" to "Very Integrationist" were categorized by 
three groups of subjects. 
One group consisted of Negro college students attending an all· 
Negro, completely segregated public school system (highly involved, pro• 
integration). A fraternity located in the South and known for its mod• 
erate adherence to Southern traditions defined a "moderately involved, 
pro-segregation" group of subjects. Group three was an unselected, 
heterogeneous sample of white students considered, as a group, to be 
least ego-involved, pro-segregation· in their attitudes. 
Based on prior research (Sherif & Hovland, 1953), subjects were 
dichotomized according to whether or not they used five or more cate• 
gories. Results indicated that 36 percent of the unselected subjects 
used five or more categories. 23 percent of the Southern fraternity 
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- subjects and 7 percent of the Negro subjects used five or more cate-
gories. A significant Chi Square value (p ~ .025) for the comparison of 
unselected subjects and fraternity subjects was found, which seems repu• 
table in view of the heterogeneity of the unselected group with respect 
to their attitudinal stand. All other Chi Square comparisons among 
groups were significant at the .005 level of confidence. 
These few studies tend to support the hypothesis that as ego• 
involvement increases, relative to a given social stimulus domain, the 
number of categories used to subdivide that stimulus domain decreases. 
Width of Acceptable and Objectionable Categories as an Index of 
Ego-Involvement 
The width of an acceptable or an objectionable category is de-
fined by the number of statements placed in it. It is suggested by the 
following research that the number of statements placed within accept• 
able or objectionable categories is a function of ego-involvement with 
the stimulus domain. 
The highly ego-involved pro-Negro subjects in Sherif & Hovland's 
(1953) study placed only 27 of the 114 statements into "acceptable" 
categories, and placed 65 statements into 0 objectionable" categories. 
The low-ego-involved group in this same study placed 43 and 38 state• 
ments into "acceptable" and "objectionable" categories, respectively. 
The highly involved League of Women Voters in Reich & Sherif's 
(1963) study placed over half of the 60 statements into "objectionable" 
categories, while the low-ego-involved teachers placed about the same 
number of statements into all self-selected categories or groups of 
statements. 
Kosl_in, Waring & Pargament (1965) had Peace Corps volunteers 
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rank five social issues according to how much time they spent talking 
about them. The amount of time spent talking about an issue operation• 
ally served as an index of ego-involvement. Next, the Peace Corps 
subjects were asked to sort five corresponding sets of statements into 
categories. The number of statements placed into acceptable and objec-
tionable categories on each of the five sets of statements was examined. 
Findings indicated that from the least involving issue to the most 
i~volvlng issue, the number of statements placed into acceptable cate• 
gories decreased while the number placed into objectionable categories 
increased. 
A second hypothesis in LaFave & Sherif's (1968) study stated that 
the number of statements placed within acceptable and objectionable 
categories varied as a function of ego-involvement. 
Three groups, described above as defining three relative levels of 
ego-involvement, sorted 25 segregation-integration statements into 
"groups that go together." Subjects were dichotomized according to 
whether the number of statements placed within the categories labeled as 
acceptable was greater or lesser than the number placed within the cate• 
gorles labeled as objectionable. 
Results demonstrated that the unselected sample (low-ego-involve-
ment) more frequently placed a greater number of statements into accept· 
able categories, than into categories labeled as objectionable. Over 
59 percent of the fraternity subjects (moderate level of ego-involvement) 
and 87 percent of the Negro subjects (high level of ego-involvement) 
placed less statements into acceptable categories than into objection• 
able ones. All comparisons between pairs of subject groupings were 
significant at the .001 level of confidence. 
The above two areas dealing with "number of categories" and 
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••width of acceptable and objectionable categories" have been interpreted 
by Sherif & Sherif (1969) as representing assimilation-contrast pheno-
mena. 
Briefly, high-ego-involved subjects contrast intermediate items 
away from their own anchor category, i.e., that category of statements 
designated as "most acceptable." For this reason a disproportionately 
large number of attitude statements are placed into objectionable cate• 
gories. Hence, the width of objectionable categories becomes enlarged, 
relative to the width of acceptable categories. For low-ego-involved 
subjects, the tendency to use a comparatively larger number of cate• 
gories containing a nearly equal number of statements in each one, sug• 
gests the absence of sharp assimilation-contrast effects. LaFave & 
Sherif (1968) found a slight tendency for low-ego-involved subjects to 
assimilate intermediate statements toward their anchor category. In 
this respect the width of acceptable categories was somewhat larger than 
that of objectionable categories. Although this tendency toward assimi• 
lation by low-ego-involved subjects was mild, it has been observed by 
Hovland & Sherif (1953), Sherif & Nebergall, (1965), Reich & Sherif 
(1963), and Vaughan (1961). 
Summary of Basic Concepts 
The above cited research collectively SU?ports the following hypo-
theses regarding highly ego-involved subjects judging a bipolar dimen• 
sion of social stimulus events. 
High-Ego-Involvement 
Highly ego-involved subjects are very selective and limiting in 
what is acceptable to them as demonstrated by a comparatively small 
latitude of acceptance, a latitude of noncommitment that approaches a 
zero value, and a disproportionately large latitude of rejection. 
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There has been some variability of results regarding the size of 
the latitude of acceptance associated with high-ego-involvement. When 
subject groups have at once been extreme in their attitude position, 
ho~ogeneous, and highly involved with the issue under study, then the 
latitude of acceptance has been constrictively small. However, a more 
conservative generalization that holds across studies when some of these 
conditions are not fully met ts that high-ego-involved subjects exhibit 
a restricted latitude of noncommitment and disproportionately large 
latitude of rejection. This generalization holds regardless of the ex-
tremity of the "own position." Therefore, if a subject group is not 
altogether homogeneous with regard to attitude position, the latitude of 
noncommltment and rejection may, nevertheless, serve as reliable indices 
of ego-involvement. 
The highly involved subject tends to subdivide a psychosocial 
scale of attitude statements into a comparatively few "groups that go 
together." The placement of stimulus events into self-selected cate• 
gories approximates a bimodal distribution, with a comparatively small 
number of statements being placed into acceptable categories and a dis-
proportionately large number of intermediate items being contrasted 
into objectionable categories. 
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For high-ego-involved subjects, contrast effects are predictable 
for a given stimulus event when it lies just "outside" of the latitude 
of acceptance, while assimilation occurs if the event lies just "within" 
the latitude of acceptance. This statement relates assimilation-con-
trast effects to level of ego-involvement and to "extent of discre-
pancy." 
Assimilation-contrast effects are heightened, with a marked accen-
tuation of the contrast phenomenon in highly involved subjects. 
Low-Ego-Involvement 
For low-ego-involved subjects, the latitude of acceptance is equal 
to, or so~etimes lar~er than the latitude of rejection; and the lati-
tude of noncommitment is, generally, as large as either of the other two 
latitudes. On the average, the stimulus domain is divided into approxi• 
mately three equal size latitudes. 
Presented with a social stimulus dO'Tiain that is defined as les·s 
ego-involving, subjects employ a comparatively greater number of self· 
selected categories to organize the domain of events into "groups that 
go together." 
The comparatively larger number of categories employed contain a 
nearly equal distribution, or number of events in each category. 
For low-ego-involved subject, the exhibition of assimilation• 
contrast effects is diminutive. A stimulus event falling within the 
latitude of acceptance is assimilated toward the 0 own position." A 
stimulus event falling within the latitude of noncommltment fails to 
elicit systematic assimilation or contrast effects. However, there is a 
mild trend toward assimilation in this case. 
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The above two sections may be further condensed by summarizing the 
judgment pattern of highly involved, extreme attitude subjects as bi• 
modal. Social stimulus events falling within the latitude of acceptance 
are assimilated and judged as acceptable. However, social stimulus 
events lying just outside the latitude of acceptance are contrasted 
away, and judged to be objectionable. The range of social stimulus 
events which elicit noncornmital or neutral judgments is restrictively 
narrow. 
The judgment pattern of low-involved, moderate attitude subjects 
may be summarized as rectangular. The bipolar continuum of social 
stimulus events is distributed into nearly equal size areas of accept-
able, neutral, and objectionable events. 
What seems to have occurred in the above collection of studies, is 
that a number of independent researchers (cited above) have turned to 
different problems, using different subject populations, and employing 
somewhat different methodological procedures and statistical designs but 
essentially using the same set of basic concepts. Although specific 
results are not, precisely speaking, equivalent, they do seem theoreti• 
cally consistent and mutually supportive to a reasonable degree. 
Extrapolating from the above literature, it would appear that 
high-ego-involved subjects subscribing to an extreme attitude position 
tend to dichotomize a psychosocial scale, i.e., intermediate scale items 
are contrasted into the latitude of rejection, thus reducing the range 
of noncommital attitude positions. According to Tittler's (1967) re-
search, amenability to attitude change is limited when the latitude of 
noncommitment is so narrowed. These findings suggest a tendency toward 
"black or whitett or dogmatic judgment patterns. The following section 
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elaborates on this possibility. 
"Black or White" Judgment Patterns 
An area of study dealing quite directly with "black or white" 
judgment patterns is that centered on dogmatism. Certain comparisons 
between Rokeach's (1954) cognitive model of dogmatism and the assimila-
tion-contrast model can be made. Rokeach advanced the dynamics of a 
"disbelief gradient" which predicted certain outcomes for beliefs near 
or far from the particular belief position held by a dogmatic subject. 
The greater the dogmatism the more will two or more disbelief 
subsystems represented as positions relatively far away from 
the belief system along the disbelief gradient be perceived 
as the same.-••• the greater the dogmatism the greater the 
assimilation of facts or events at variance with either the 
belief or disbelief system by altering or reinterpreting them 
such that they will no longer be perceived as contradictory. 
(Rokeach, 1954). 
These two propositions appear to parallel assimilation-contrast 
effects. The first proposition, that two or more disbeliefs relatively 
far away from the belief system are "perceived as the same," appears to 
correspond with contrast effects occurring within the latitude of rejec-
tion. The second proposition, that events at variance with the belief 
system may be reinterpreted "such that they will no longer be perceived 
as contradictory," appears to correspond with assimilation effects 
occurring within the latitude of acceptance. 
According to Rokeach (1954), the dogmatic subject is noted by cog-
nitive patterns which tend to dichotomize or polarize events lying on a 
belief-disbelief dimension. It has also been noted that high-ego• 
involved subjects maintaining relatively extreme "own positions" tend to 
dichotomize a psychosocial scale into latitudes of acceptance and rejec-
tion (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). 
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Powell (1966) conducted a series of three studies. The primary 
aim of each study was a correlational comparison between Rokeach's 
(1954) "belief-disbelief dimension" and the latitudes of acceptance, 
noncommitment, and rejection as formulated in the assimilation-contrast 
model. 
Four hypotheses were tested in each study. The greater the dogma• 
tism or close-mindedness of an individual: 1) the narrower is his lati-
tude of acceptance; 2) the narrower is his latitude of noncommitment; 
3) the broader is his latitude of rejection; and 4) the more extreme is 
his own attitude position along a bipolar attitude dimension. 
In all three studies Powell (1966) found that as dogmatism in• 
creased, the latitude of noncommitment decreased, and the latitude of 
rejection increased. In all three studies it was found that as dogma-
tism increased, the "own ~osition" moved to a more extreme position on 
a bipolar attitude scale. However, high dogmatism scores were not found 
to be associated with narrower latitudes of acceptance in any of th·e 
three studies. 
Powell concluded his investigation by suggesting that: 
Sherif and Hovland's description of latitudes of acceptance 
and rejection, and Rokeach in his conceptualization of the 
belief and disbelief system-dimension are essentially con-
cerned with similar, if not the same, cognitive phenomena. 
The significant correspondence between narrowed latitudes of non• 
commitment, enlarged latitudes of rejection, extreme "own positions" 
and high dogmatism scores suggest that the latitude of rejection may be 
a reasonable representation of the disbelief system as formulated in 
Rokeach's cognitive model of dogmatism. Following the joint outlines of 
both the assimilation-contrast model and Rokeach's formulation of the 
belief-disbelief gradient, the latitude of rejection is taken to be the 
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clearest empirical representation of that area of judgment where concep-
tual dedifferentiation is most likely to occur. 
The descriptive phrase, "black or white judgment," generally re• 
fers to a dedifferentiation process. Social stimulus events sharing 
some degree of categorical similarity are perceived as equivalent 
events, while relevant dissimilarities are selectively ignored (Allport, 
1958). The resulting pattern of judgment appears to be dedifferentiated 
and is accordingly described as "black or white." With humans, the 
ability to function at the conceptual level suggests that dedifferentia• 
tion may be due, in part, to categorizing two or more stimulus events as 
conceptually equiva_lent. A simple example is given. If A • B, and 
B • C, then A• C. Although these three stimulus events do not look 
alike, at the conceptual level, they may be responded to identically. 
Applying this syllogism to lettered designations of a psychosocial 
scale, conceptual dedifferentiation would be indicated by a latitude of 
rejection containing the following equivalencies: E • F • G • H • I. 
In a sense this has been demonstrated in the manner where each of 
several attitude positions has been equated with the label, ••objection• 
able." 
However, in the framework of Leonard Berkowitz (1960), the label, 
"objectionable," may be viewed as a "supracategory" within which 11smal-
ler categories are placed," i.e., crime may serve as the supracategory 
under which petty theft and homicide may be classified as smaller cate• 
gories. It may be an oversight to assume that the conceptual meaning of 
the two infractions are equivalent, except at a very general level where 
both may be categorized as (objectionable) crimes. From this perspec-
tive, the equivalency, E • F • G • H •I• objectionable, may have 
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reference to the "supracategory level" of conceptualization, i.e., all 
i Uegal acts are, generically, crime and therefore objectionable. How00 
ever, it would seem that the descriptive phrase, "black or white" refers 
to the condition symbolized here as E • F • G • H •I• equally objec-
tionable, i.e., all illegal acts are equally objectionable. Translated 
into assimilation-contrast model terms, a "black or white" judgment pat-
tern should be demonstrated by a latitude of rejection containing a 
series of social stimulus events judged to be equally objectionable, 
not just generically objectionable. 
Our courts of law provide an excellent illustration of conceptual 
differentiation occurring within latitudes of rejection, which is in• 
d~xed by the empirical response of punishment. If we could consider 
homicide to represent an extreme event along a dimension of "physical 
response to others" and simultaneously suppose that homicide probably 
falls toward the extreme end of the latitude of rejection, then we have 
a noteworthy example of conceptual differentiation occurring within a 
latitude of rejection. To wit, the presence of conceptual differentia-
tion between first, second, and third degree murder may be indexed by 
the degree of punishment allocated to each. 
It is quite likely that any form of homicide would fall into the 
latitude of rejection, and yet it can be seen that fine conceptual dis-
criminations are retained. However, the process of jurisprudence in• 
cludes a rigorous system of debate usually by two opposing side, a 
district attorney and a defendent. Probably for this reason, the pro-
cess of making conceptual differentiations within a latitude of rejec-
tion is.safeguarded, even to the extent that appeal to higher courts of 
law provide additional opportunity to alter the conceptual meaning of an 
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act. 
Given a lay subject, unopposed in his private judgments, what 
degree of conceptual differentiation within a latitude of rejection 
could we expect? Would the degree of conceptual differentiation differ 
according to level of ego-involvement? 
Statement of Problem 
The overall purpose of this study was to investigate judgment pat-
terns within the latitude of rejection. 
A principle interest was to determine whether conceptual dediffer-
entiation occurs within the latitude of rejection. This statement does 
not refer to what has been labeled the 0 supracategory leveltt (where all 
crimes are objectionable), but to the "categQry level" (where all crimes 
are equally objectionable). It is important to retain this distinction. 
The term, conceptual dedifferentiation, is itself a rather broad 
one. To delineate its meaning and application within this study, it 
will be defined by the event where graduated attitude positions falling 
within the latitude of rejection are judged as equally objectionable. 
With this definition in mind, the specific problems addressed in 
this study may be phrased. Does conceptual dedifferentiation occur 
within the latitude of rejection? Is there a difference in the degree 
of conceptual dedifferentiation between high-ego-involved subjects ad-
hering to a relatively extreme attitude position and low-ego-involved 
subjects subscribing to a moderate attitude position? Compared with 
low-ego-involved subjects, do high-ego-involved subjects give more ex-
treme, negatively weighted judgments to statements within their respec• 
tive latitudes of rejection? 
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To answer these questions, two groups of subjects were administer• 
ed a psychosocial scale of 12 statements ranging from extremely pro-
religious to extremely anti-religious. One group consisted of high-ego• 
involved, pro-religious attitude subjects; the second group consisted of 
low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects, hereafter re-
ferred to as Group I and Group II, respectively. Latitudes of accept• 
ance, noncommitment, and rejection were obtained in the customary man• 
ner from each group. 
Those attitude positions designated by a subject as objectionable 
(latitude of rejection) were in turn presented to the subject for fur• 
ther evaluation. Subjects were requested to indicate the degree of ob• 
jection attributed to these statements on a nine-point graded rating 
scale labeled "slightly objectionable" and "extremely objectionable" at 
either end. 
Hypothesis One 
Compared with low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude sub-
jects, high-ego-involved pro-religious attitude subjects exhibited dis-
proportionately large latitudes of rejection and small latitudes of non-
commitment; oC ~ .os. 
A confirmation of Hypothesis One would suggest that high-ego-in• 
volved, pro-religious attitude subjects tended to dichotomize the psy• 
chosocial scale, i.e., intermediate scale items were contrasted into the 
latitude of rejection thus reducing the range of neutral events. 
Hypothesis One also served as a secondary check on methodological 
design. The proposed relationships in Hypothesis One have been pre-
viously confirmed (Powell, 1966; LaFave & Sherif, 1968). Therefore if 
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the procedures for establi~hing two qualitatively different subject 
groups and for constructing a bipolar attitude scale were both adequate, 
then the relationships in Hypothesis One should be again confirmed.· 
Hypothesis Two 
Compared with low-ego•involved, mildly pro-religious attitude sub• 
jects, high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects exhibited 
greater conceptual dedifferentiation within their individual latitudes 
of rejection; oC ~ .os. 
The empirical index for measuring degree of conceptual dediffer-
entiation is somewhat lengthy and detailed to include at this point (see 
page 47). However, if Group I subjects tended to judge statements with• 
in their latitude of rejection as equally objectionable, while Group II 
subjects maintained distinction among such statements, then Hypothesis 
Two should be confirmed. 
Hypothesis Three 
The relative frequency with which Group I and Group II used 
rating scale category "i" to evaluate statements within the latitude of 
rejection was significantly different;OC: ~ .os. 
Under Hypothesis Three, a between groups comparison on each of the 
nine rating scale categories was conducted. These comparisons would 
identify which rating scale categories were characteristically used 
more frequently by one group, compared to the other. Results from these 
tests should indicate whether or not high•ego·involved subjects could be 
differentially characterized as using the more extreme, negatively 
weighted categories of the rating scale. 
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If the above hypotheses are confirmed in the expected direction, 
then high-ego-involved, extreme attitude subjects may be described by a 
tendency to dichotomize the psychosocial scale, to dedifferentiate those 
attitude positions falling within their disproportionately large lati• 




This chapter is organized into three parts: 1) definitions of 
major variables and measurement techniques, each followed by supporting 
rationale; 2) test procedures for obtaining data required to test each 
of the three hypotheses; 3) a series of three phases of study, each 
extracting and organizing data necessary to explicitly test a separate 
hypothesis. 
Psychosocial Scale of Religious Attitudes 
Sherif & Sherif (1969; pp. 395) recommended the following proce-
dure for constructing a bipolar psychosocial attitude scale. From a 
pool of attitude statements, extract out about eleven statements which 
can be reliably rank-ordered from one polar extreme to the other. No 
assumption of equal intervals between statements comprising the final 
scale need be made. 
Thurstone & Chave's (1929) scale of 45 attitude statements toward 
the church served as the pool of statements from which final scale items 
were selected. Items making up this pool of 45 statements have been 
scaled, weighted and organized by Thurstone & Chave into 12 class inter-
vals ranging from one polar extreme to the other. 
Below is the final scale of attitude statements and their corres-
ponding weights indicated in parentheses. They have been arranged in 
descending order from extremely pro-religious to extremely anti-reli· 
gious. 
(.02) I believe the church is the greatest institution in 
America. 
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(1.0) I believe the church has grown up with the primary purpose 
of perpetuating the spirit and teachings of Jesus and de• 
serves loyal support. 
(2.2) I like to go to church for I get something worthwhile to 
think about and it keeps my mind filled with right 
thoughts. 
(3.1) I do not understand the dogmas or creeds of the church but 
I find that the church helps me to be more honest and 
creditable. 
(4.0) I believe in the church and its teachings because I have 
been accustomed to them since I was a child. 
(S.l) I like the ceremonies of my church but do not miss them 
much when I stay away. 
(6.1) I feel the need for religion but do not find what I want 
in any one church. 
(7.2) I believe the churches are too much divided by factions 
and denominations to be a strong force for righteousness. 
(8.3) I think the teachings of the church are altogether too 
superficial to have much social significance. 
(9.2) I think the church seeks to impose a lot of worn-out 
dogmas and medieval superstitions. 
(10.4) The church represents shallowness, hypocrisy, and 
prejudice. 
(li.O) I think the church is a parasite on society. 
The above procedure for constructing a psychosocial scale gener-
ally conformed to Sherif & Sherif's (1969) recommendations while pro• 
viding a clearer measure of the psychological spacing between items as 
defined by the Thurstone•s (1929) equal appearing interval technique. 
Subjects 
Group I. High-Ego-Involved, Pro•Religiou·s Attitude Subjects 
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This group consisted of 36 Oklahoma State University freshmen and/ 
or sophmores who satisfied all three criteria operationally defining 
high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects: the subject indi· 
cated an 80 to 100 percent church attendance for the past year; the 
subject indicated that he is currently an active member of an university 
student religious group; from a list of five social issues (politics, 
drugs, religion, education, and ecology) the subject ranked the topic 
of religion as first in terms of personal importance. 
Group II. Low-Ego-Involved, Mildly Pro-Religious Attitude Subjects 
This group consisted of 36 Oklahoma State University freshmen and/ 
or sophmores who satisfied all three criteria operationally defining 
low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects: the subject 
34 
indicated a 5 to 25 percent church attendance for the past year; the 
subject was not a current member of a student religious group; from a 
list of five social issues (politics, drugs, religion, education, and 
ecology) the subject ranked the topic of religion as fourth in terms of 
personal importance. 
Rationale for Defining Subject Groups 
The criteria of "percent church attendance" was used primarily to 
estimate a relatively long-term behavioral pattern. The criteria of 
"membership to an university religious group" attempted to identify a 
relevant reference group with which a subject may identify. Even though 
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a subject may have a relatively long-established behavioral pattern of 
frequently attending church (801 minimum) and indicates that he is a 
member of a student religious group, it cannot be clearly assumed that 
these affiliations indicate important reference groups. For this rea-
son, the criteria of "ranking five social issues" in terms of personal 
importance was applied (Koslin, Waring, & Pargament, 1965; Tittler, 
1967). If the subject attends church for social reasons which do not 
include a personal belief in religion itself, then it would be expected 
that the topic of religion would not be ranked as personally most im• 
portant. 
The classification, "low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious atti-
tude subjects" was intended to designate persons who exhibit a compara• 
tively low level of involvement and who subscribe to attitude positions 
that mildly favor religion. 
To obtain such subjects, it seemed necessary to continue to use 
the same criteria dimensions used for selecting high-ego-involved, pro-
religious attitude subjects. To retain the same criteria-dimensions 
provided greater assurance that the two groups in this study differed 
from each other relative to the same selection criteria. 
35 
For example. If high involvement was indexed by 80 to 100 percent 
church attendance over the past year, then subjects who attend church 
services between 5 and 25 percent may be defined, relative to highly 
involved subjects, as manifesting low involvement. 
Defining one group, relative to another group along the same cri• 
teria·dimensions seemed to provide for greater internal consistency 
within the selection procedure. 
For each of the three criteria-dimensions, low-ego-involved, 
mildly pro-religious attitude subjects were defined by relative criteria 
suggesting low involvement and mildly pro-religious attitude positions. 
Students who indicate a zero percent church attendance, non-
membership to a student religious group, and rank the topic of religion 
as least important may subscribe to a set of values which exclude reli-
gious beliefs associated with a church, e.g., agnostics, naturalists, 
mystics, etc. To control for such heterogeneity, the criteria of 5 to 
25 percent church attendance and of ranking the importance of religion 
as fourth was chosen. These criteria specifically designate a subject's 
relative position on these dimensions. Given that a subject attended 5 
to 25 percent of his church services for the last year and ranked the 
topic of religion as fourth in terms of personal importance, then non• 
membership to a student religious group further supports the assumptions 
of low-involvement with organized religious groups. 
As an independent check on the validity of selection procedures, 
a hypothesis was included which predicted certain latitude patterns for 
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each group (see Hypothesis One). The predicted latitude patterns for 
-subjects defined as high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects 
were those found to be associated with high-ego-involved, extremely pro-
attitude subjects (Sherif,~·!!•, 1965; Powell, 1966). The predicted 
latitude patterns for subjects defined as low-ego-involved, mildly pro-
religious attitude subjects were those found to be associated with low-
ego-involved, mildly pro-attitude subjects (Sherif,~·!!•, 1965; 
Powell, 1966). 
The choice of subject groups represented above needs comment. The 
variable along which subjects were classified was actually a composite 
variable made up of two related components, level of ego-involvement and 
attitude position. Several research reviews (Cantril, 1946; Allport, 
1943; O'Donovan, 1965) collectively support the hypothesis that extrem-
ity of attitude position is positively associated with high involvement 
with the attitude domain. 
Within Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall's (1965) work where the rela-
tionship between extremity of attitude and level of involvement was 
qualified, the major findings supported the hypothesis of a positive 
association between the two components. Groups of subjects equally ex• 
treme from the mid-position of a psychosocial scale exhibited mirror 
image profiles of judgment. Latitude patterns and assimilation-contrast 
effects were found to be juxtapositioned. At the nomothetic level of 
data analysis, as the attitude position became more extreme, the level 
of involvement increased. However, Sherif,~·!!.·, (1965) pointed out 
that there were exceptions to this generalization that could be identi-
fled by the relative sizes of the latitudes of noncommitment and rejec• 
tion, e.g., high-ego-involved subjects, regardless of the extremity of 
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their attitude position, exhibit comparatively large latitudes of rejec-
tion and small latitudes of noncommitment. To emphasize the idiographic 
character of this qualification, Powell (1966) found, in a triad of 
three studies, significant correlations between "extremity of the own 
position" and heightened involvement as defined by small latitudes of 
noncommitment and large latitudes of rejection. 
The literature which supports the hypothesis of a positive rela• 
tionship between extremity of attitude position and level of involvement 
was based on nomothetic data. There were individual subjects within 
these studies who violated this generalization, however these represent-
ed statistically rare events. 
It is felt that the significant relationship found between extrem-
ity of attitude position and level of ego-involvement indicates that the 
two components oft.he composite variable are reliably correlated. Em-
pirically, it seemed meaningful to retain this correlation when select-
ing subject groups. 
Following this line of thought, there are other possible levels of 
the composite variable, tttevel of involvement and attitude position," 
that could be studied. Theoretically, if the psychosocial scale con• 
tained 12 attitude positions, then there are approximately 12 levels of 
pro-religious attitude available for study. However, meaningful differ-
ences between any two subjects subscribing to adjacent attitude posi-
tions with nearly equal levels of involvement have not yet been defined. 
The above cited assimilation-contrast studies have dealt with subject 
groups which were easily differentiated through widely contrasting be-
havioral criteria. It was felt that selection criteria attempting to 
differentiate several closely related groups along the composite vari-
able would likely be unreliable, thus making an interpretation of non• 
significant differences between groups a questionable enterprise. 
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A group of highly involved subjects advocating extreme anti-reli-
gious attitudes would provide a desirable contrast to the other two 
groups. But unlike political or racial issues the informal or formal 
institutionalization of anti-religious groups in our culture is non-
existent. Therefore, procuring such individuals would require screening 
an unknown and probably vast number of subjects. 
The.primary intent of this study was to compare the degree of 
judgmental differentiation made within the latitude of rejection. It 
was of central importance to use groups which clearly differ on level of 
ego-involvement and attitude position. It was felt that the above se-
lection criteria for each group was sufficiently dissimilar to provide 
two groups which reliably differ, on the composite variable. 
Latitudes of Acceptance, Noncommitment, 
and Rejection 
Given the above psychosocial scale of attitude statements, a sub-
ject is requested to designate one statement that is "most acceptable" 
and then to designate any other ••acceptable" statements. The union of 
"most acceptable" and "acceptable" statements operationally defined a 
subject's latitude of acceptance. The subject is then requested to 
designate one statement which is "most objectionable" and then asked to 
indicate any other "objectionable" statements. These statements opera-
tionally defined a subject's latitude of rejection. Statements judged 
neither acceptable nor objectionable operationally defined a subject's 
latitude of noncommitment. 
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The above procedures for operationally defining the three lati-
tudes replicate those procedures cited in the above collection of 
assimilation-contrast studies. 
Rating Scale 
The degree of objection ascribed to an attitude statement within 
the latitude of rejection was operationally defined by a numerical score 
obtained from a nine-point graded rating scale attached beneath each 
attitude .statement. 
The rating scale was labeled at one end with the phrase; •'Slightly 
Objectionable," and labeled at the opposite end with the phrase, nEx-
tremely Objectionable.•• An example follows. 






1 1 1 
3 4 
1 1 






The above example was taken from the actual scale of statements 
used in this study. A subject was simply requested to designate a cate-
gory on the rating scale corresponding to his opinion of the statements. 
Buffer illustrations were given to subjects to clarify the meaning, 
range and use of the rating scale. 
The scale of measurement for the nine-point rating scale was ord-
inal. The meaning of a distribution of scores obtained from the nine• 
point rating scale is relative to the distribution of scores obtained 
from other individuals using the same rating scale under similar 
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conditions. 
The four basic components of this research have been operationally 
defined: a psychosocial scale of attitude statements, subject groups, 
latitude of acceptance, noncommitment and rejection, and degree of ob-
jection as measured by a nine-point rating scale. The following test 
procedures describe how these components were empirically manipulated to 
generate a pool of data. 
Procedure and Instructions 
In order to increase interest in the task itself and to control 
for an unknown variety of personal hypotheses toward the purpose of the 
task, an introductory statement was given: 
Within the area of economics and product marketing, ex-
pensive surveys are taken to estimate public reaction. With 
this feedback, products can be improved to meet the needs of 
the public. The church has no established methods for esti-
mating public opinion regarding its function in today's rapid· 
ly changing society. You have been carefully and individually 
selected to be a part of the first comprehensive survey to 
give honest opinions toward religion as it is today. 
The above preface seemed sufficiently ambiguous to avoid giving 
implicit sanctions, either favorable or unfavorable, toward religion. 
The 12 attitude statements were placed on individual cards, which 
included the nine category graded rating scale beneath each statement. 
Individual sets of the 12 cards were given to each subject. Each set 
had been thoroughly shuffled to randomize possible order effects. 
Instructions 
Please select one statement which you personally consider 
to be most acceptable and separate it from the other state-
ments (pause). Now select any other statements which you per-
sonally consider to be acceptable and place them into a single 
pile along with your most acceptable statement. (Latitude of 
acceptance). 
Now choose one statement that you consider to be most 
objectionable and separate it from the other statements by 
starting a new pile (pause). Now select any other state-
ments which are objectionable to you, and group them into a 
second pile long with your most objectionable statement. 
(Latitude of rejection). 
Please write a question mark(?) on the upper right hand 
corner of any remaining statements which you have not placed 
in either the acceptable or objectionable piles of statements 
(latitude of noncommitment). Then place the letter non, on 
the upper right hand corner of each statement in the objec-
tionable pile. (Pause). 
Now thoroughly shuffle all ofthe statements together 
into one mixed pile. (This step was taken to randomize the 
order of statement presentation for the following test pro-
cedire). 
Please go through the shuffled pile and rate each objec-
tionable statement marked with the letter "O" according to 
the rating scale beneath it. Do not rate any statement which 
you have not designated by the letter "O". Before you begin 
let me illustrate a few examples to explain the rating scale. 
The following three statements served as the buffer examples. 
"Churchgoers all want to be spoon-fed instead of thinking for them-
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selves." "The church is a part of a capitalistic scheme to keep people 
down." "I regard the church as a static, crystallized institution and 
as such it is unwholesome and detr.fmental to society and the indivi-
dual." (Thurstone & Chave, 1929, pp. 88). As a group, these statements 
cluster toward the extreme, anti-religion end of Thurstone•s scale. 
Accordingly, they should focus the interest of most subjects on the pro-
blem of how to use the rating scale to express a personal reaction to an 
antagonistic statement. 
Any questions regarding the use of the rating scale were answered 
in descriptive, rather than interpretive terms, e.g., "Notice that the 
rating scale is labeled slightly objectionable at one end and extreme-
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ly objectionable at the other end. A rating scale value of one repre-
sents slight objection and a value of nine represents extreme objection. 
Simply place a mark on the rating scale that represents your opinion 
toward the statement." 
Buffer examples were also expected to help reduce the possibility 
of artificial "piling-up effects," i.e., the possibility of a subject 
ascribing a rating scale value of 8 to the first objectionable statement 
and then being "forced" to ascribe a score of 9 to all subsequent state• 
ments more objectionable than the initial one. A post-test inquiry was 
conducted to determine whether subjects felt that the range of rating 
scale values confined them to an unavoidable repetition of certain 
rating scale categories (piling-up effects). At the conclusion of the 
rating of objectionable statements the following instructions were deli• 
vered. 
If you felt that the range of values on the rating scale 
was too small, and that this forced you to use some of the rat• 
ing scale values more frequently than you wanted to, please 
write a "yes" on the back of the statement which was "most 
acceptable" to you. If you do not feel that the range of rat• 
ing scale values was too small, please write a "nott on the back 
of this statement. (This instruction was given twice, slowly, 
to insure its meaning). 
The above testing procedures provided all the necessary data for 
testing each of the three hypotheses. The remainder of this chapter 
was divided into three phases of study; each phase extracted and organ• 
!zed data necessary to test a separate hypothesis. 
Phase One Data Analysis 
Compared to low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude sub· 
jects, the high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects exhibited 
disproportionately large latitudes of rejection and small latitudes of 
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noncommitrnent. The purpos~ of this hypothesis was to determine whether 
high-ego-involved extreme attitude subjects tend to dichotomize the 
psychosocial scale. The secondary purpose was a check on methodological 
design. If the criteria for defining Group I and Group II subjects were 
adequate, and if the procedure for scale construction actually satisfied 
the reco'lllllendations of Sherif & Sherif (1969; pp. 385), then assimila-
tion-contrast effects should be present and Hypothesis One subsequently 
confirmed (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; pp. 402). 
This phase of study did not incorporate the variable, size of the 
latitude of acceptance because of its• equivocal relationship to level 
of ego-involvement and extremity of attitude position. (See Summary of 
Basic Concepts, page 19). Since the size of the latitude of acceptance 
has not been reliably associated with level of ego-involvement or ex-
tremity of attitude position, it was not used to substantiate the dif· 
ferential presence of these conditions. The latitudes of noncommitment 
and rejection serve this function with greater reliability. (See page 
11). 
Variable One. Relative Size of the Latitude of Rejection to the 
Latitude of Noncommitment 
For a given subject, the relative size of the latitude of rejec-
tion to the latitude of noncommitment was defined by the proportion, 
number of objectionable statements divided by the number of objection-
able and neutral statements summed together, i.e., n • -=n~+m.,.,... 
The proportion, n , represents a configural measurement; it 
n+m 
measures the relationship between two classes of response, n and m. For 
example, as n increases, and m decreases or remains constant, the pro-
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portion n approaches a value of one or unity. Values of n 
n+m n+m 
near unity represent disproportionately large latitudes of rejection and 
small latitudes of noncommitment •. This relationship has been found as• 
sociated with high-ego-involved, pro-attitude subjects exhibiting marked 
assimilation-contrast effects (Sherif, ~.al., 1965; Powell, 1966). 
Each subject has a total of n + m number of statements designated 
as objectionable and neutral, respectively. The denominator, n + m, 
defines all statements not included within a subject's latitude of 
acceptance. The index, n , represents the percent or proportion of 
n+m 
all statements !!2! falling within the latitude of acceptance, which are 
labeled as objectionable. A familiar analogy is offered to further 
clarify the meaning of the index, n • 
n+m 
Let n + m represent 100 items of an objective, midterm exam. Let 
n represent the number of test items passed, and m the number of test 
items failed. The index, n , may be recognized as the familiar cal-
n+m 
culation for determining percent of items passed. Furthermore, if 80 
percent of a student's responses are correct, then necessarily 20 per-
cent must be incorrect. Strictly speaking, the index n describes 
n+m 
only the percent of class n responses obtained. However, in a two• 
class population of responses, the index n also describes the per-
n+m 
cent of class m responses obtained, e.g., in this example, the propor-
tion of correct test responses is 80 percent to 20 percent. Thus in a 
two-class population the index n allows one to describe t~e propor-
n+m 
tion of class n to class m responses. Accordingly, the index n was 
n+m 
used to describe the proportion of objectionable to neutral statements. 
If high-ego-involved subjects exhibit disproportionately large 
latitudes of rejection and small latitudes of noncommitment, then the 
45 
proportion of objectionable to neutral statements should be high. If 
Hypothesis One is supported, i.e., compared to the low-ego-involved sub· 
ject group, the high-ego-involved subject group exhibits disproportion• 
ately large latitudes of rejection and small latitudes of noncommitment, 
' then the n scores of the high-ego-involved subjects should be great• 
~~-n +m 
er than the n scores of the low-ego-involved subjects. 
~~-n +m 
Accordingly, the variable, n , was divided into ~wo mutually 
n+m 
exclusive and exhaustive classes of events by dichotomizing scores above 
and below the median value of n • Scores were categorized under one 
n+m 
of two headings, "Proportion of Objectionable to Neutral Statements 
Greater than the Median Value of n ," and, "Proportion of Objection-
n+m 
able to Neutral Statements Equal to, or Less than the Median Value of 
n ·" 
n+m 
Variable Two. Levels of Ego-Involvement, Pro-Religious Attitude 
The two levels of this variable have been defined by Group I and 
Group II, i.e., high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude and low-ego-
involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects (see page 33). 
Procedure 
The procedure for obtaining latitudes of noncommitment and rejec• 
tion from Group I and Group II has been described above (see page 38). 
Statistical Design 
A 2 by 2 Chi Square design was employed. Subjects were dichoto-
mized along the variable, level of ego-involvement, pro-religious atti• 
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tude, according to their defined membership to either Group I or Group 
II. Subjects were also dichotomized along the variable n • Two 
n+m 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes of n events were defined. 
n+m 
"Proportion of Objectionable to Neutral Statements Greater than the 
Median Value of n • " And, "Proportion of Objectionable to Neutral n+m 
Statements Equal to, or Less than the Median Value of n • " The ex-n+m 
pected frequency per cell was 17, which should provide a good approxima-
tion to the Chi Square distribution. The level of significance was set 
at the .OS level. 
Although the two variables may be associated with each other, this 
does not tell us to what extent they covary, or to what degree they are 
associated. A test for the magnitude of association was conducted to 
determine whether this was a small but significant association or whe• 
ther it was a large association. The Goodman•Kruskal index of predic-
tive association (Hayes, 1963; pp. 608) was used for this purpose. The 
index of predictive association defines.the reduction in the probability 
of error for predicting levels of variable one, given information on 
variable two. Specifically, given information on whether a subject be• 
longs to Group I or to Group II, how well can it be predicted that a 
subject will exhibit one or the other latitude pattern. 
Phase Two Data Analysis 
Phase two specifically organized a test of Hypothesis Two, i.e., 
compared with low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects, 
high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects exhibited greater 
conceptual dedifferentiation within their individual latitudes of rejec-
tion. 
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Individual latitudes of rejection were free to vary in size and lo-
cation along the bipolar attitude scale. Amount of conceptual dediffer-
entiatlon was measured within each.subject's self-chosen range of objec-
tionable statements. Scores representing amount of conceptual dediffer-
entiation were arranged into two columns, corresponding to Group I and 
Group II. A statistical comparison between the two groups followed. 
Independent Variable. Individual Latitudes of Rejection 
An individual latitude of rejection was operationally defined by 
those statements designated as objectionable by a given subject. 
Dependent Variable. Conceptual Dedifferentiation Within an Individual 
Latitude of Rejection 
The amount of dedifferentiation within an individual latitude of 
rejection was operationally defined by the value, DR • 
~~Nff2~ 
The term, D, 
symbolized the number of different rating scale values used by a subject 
to evaluate those statements defining his individual latitude of rejec-
tion. The term, R, symbol'ized the range of rating scale values employed 
to evaluate statements within the latitude of rejection. The term, N, 
represented the number of statements defining a subject's latitude of 
rejection. 
Rationale for Dependent Variable 
Since the rating scale values follow ordinal scale principles, mea-
sures of variability or differentiation among these values that depend 
on adding and dividing could not be employed. 
The formula for measuring dedifferentiation does not actually use 
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rating scale values, only the number~ different rating scale categor• 
!es, the range 2£. rating scale categories, and the number 2!_ statements 
being evaluated. Essentially, the above formula reflects how a partic• 
ular subject distributes statements defining his own latitude of rejec-
tion over the nine-point rating scale. The following illustration is 
offered. 
RATING SCALE CATEGORIES 
1 ••• 5 6 7 8 9 N: D R DR -N2 
s1 1 0 1 0 1 3 3 5 1.66 
s2 1 1 -1 3 3 3 1.00 
S3 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 1.00 
S4 2 1 1 4 3 3 .56 
S5 2 2 2 6 3 3 .25 
s6 2 1 1 1 1 6 5 5 .10 
Figure 1. An Illustration of the Use of the Forn.ila DR'/N2 to 
Measure Differentiation Within Individual Lati• 
tudes of Rejection 
Although s1 and s2 have the same number of statements within their 
respective latitudes of rejection and both have used the same number of 
different rating categories, s1 has used a wider range of rating cate• 
gories and thereby indicated a greater distinction among statements 
within his latitude of rejection. 
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S2 and S3 exhibited the same pattern of differentiation even though 
the number of statements included within their respective latitudes of 
rejection was different. 
S3 and S4 included the same number of statements within their re-
spective latitudes of rejection, but 54 did not make as many distinc-
tions within his latitude of rejection. 54 is inferred to have exh1· 
bited less differentiation and has accordingly received the lesser 
score. 
S5 has clearly exhibited less differentiation than s4• 
S6 has the same size latitude of rejection as S5, but the distri• 
bution of 56 shows greater differentiation. Note that the score of S6 
reflects greater differentiation than that of s4, but less than that of 
S3. 
The above equation is capable of measuring the degree of differen• 
tiation for different size' latitudes of rejection. It is sensitive to 
the distribution of statements across rating scale categories. There is 
one restriction on this equation that is imposed by the range of rating 
scale values. Specifically, this equation will not be appropriate for 
latitudes of rejection containing ten or more statements. 
To illustrate the reason for this particular restriction, suppose 
a subject's latitude of rejection contained ten statements. With a rat• 
ing scale having only nine values the subject would be forced to use one 
rating scale value at least twice. The equation would detect a lack of 
differentiation that was an artifact of a limited range of rating scale 
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values. 
Since it was highly improbable that any subject would exhibit a 
latitude of rejection containing ten or more statements, it seemed rea-
sonable to limit the rating scale range to nine values. It seemed de-
sirable to limit the range of rating scale values to no more than nine 
in order to render the rating scale easier to apply. A greater number 
of rating scale values would seem cumbersome for the subject to utilize. 
Procedure 
Both Group I and Group II subjects were requested to evaluate 
statements comprising their individual latitudes of rejection according 
to the nine-point rating scale. Detailed procedures have been described 
above. 
Statistical Design 
The degree of dedifferentiation within each subject's individual 
latitude of rejection was calculated. These scores were grouped into 
two columns corresponding to Group I and Group II. The Wilcoxin Rank· 
Sum Test for identical populations, sensitive to unequal locations, was 
employed for the statistical comparison. (This test statistic is a lin• 
ear transformation of the Mann-Whitney U Test and shares the same aver• 
age relative efficiency of .955. The Wilcoxin Test was used for pur• 
poses of convenience.) A one-tailed test at the .OS level of confidence 
was conducted. 
Hypothesis Two inferred that high-ego-involved, pro-religious atti-
tude subjects exhibited greater conceptual dedifferentiation among grad· 
uated attitude statements within their individual latitudes of rejection 
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than low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects. 
Since a low-ego-involved subject may exhibit a rather small lati-
tude of rejection, say three statements, the number of statements which 
he evaluates with the nine-point rating scale may be quite limited. 
There was some question of whether or not a large enough sample of 
a subject's rating behavior was obtained. This problem arose because 
each subject self-selected the number of statements comprising his lati• 
- tude of rejection. Within a subject's own frame of reference, this may 
be a rather small number. 
A much larger pool of attitude statements was considered as one 
possible way to enhance the reliability of a subject's rating pattern. 
However, the intention to replicate the procedures used and recommended 
by Sherif & Sherif (1969) for obtaining latitudes of rejection would be 
violated, and it is of primary interest to replicate the conditions of 
previous assimilation-contrast studies and then further analyze the 
latitude of rejection. Another possibility was available, without vio• 
lating suggested procedures. 
Assuming that each group is homogeneous with respect to judgment 
patterns, it then follows that subjects from the same group should exhi• 
bit similar differentiation scores, i.e., the variance among differen-
tiation scores should be relatively small within each group if each 
group is homogeneous with respect to judgment patterns. However, the 
within-group variance should increase when rating procedures are unre• 
liable. If the number of statements were too few to yield reliable rat• 
ing patterns from low-ego-involved subjects, then their within-group 
variance should be relatively large. A test for homogeneity of variance 
between the two groups would tend to support or refute the reliability 
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of rating procedures. The Wilcoxin Rank-Sum Test of Variability served 
as the statistical method for conducting this check. The level of con• 
fidence was set at .05. 
Phase Three Data Analysis 
The purpose of phase three was to identify which, if any, of the 
nine rating scale categories were used more often by one group, compared 
to the other. 
The specific outcome of phase three depends upon the extent to 
which high-ego-involved subjects display contrast effects relative to 
low-ego-involved subjects. For example. If high-ego-involved subjects 
display extreme contrast effects while low-ego-involved subjects display 
none, then high-ego-involved subjects should displace attitude state-
ments within their latitudes of rejection toward the most negatively 
weighted rating category and low-ego-involved subjects should distribute 
their objectionable statements more evenly over the nine rating cate• 
gories. In the most extreme case, there would be a hiatus in the judg• 
ment of high-ego-involved subjects, i.e., there would be a gap in the 
rating of statements~ located within the latitude of rejection and 
those statements placed within the latitude of rejection. Described in 
empirical terms, if high-ego-involved subjects did not use rating scale 
categories one through six, but used only categories seven through nine, 
while low-ego-involved subjects used all nine rating categories with 
nearly equal frequency, then a relative gap or hiatus in the judgment of 
high-ego-involved subjects would be inferred. 
The above described "hiatus pattern" represents a somewhat extreme, 
but possible outcome. Whether such a pattern is found depends upon the 
53 
extent to which contrast effects are differentially displayed, within 
the_ latitude of rejection. The presence of contrast effects within the 
latitude _of rejection should be empirically displayed by a distribution 
of statements that is skewed, with an increasing proportion of state• 
ments displaced toward the more objectionable end of the rating scale. 
In general, this would be the expected pattern for a subject, or group 
of subjects displaying contrast effects. 
To clarify the methods used in this phase, hypothetical data are 
illustrated. The percentage of statements placed in each rating scale 
category may be calculated for each group as follows. 
Group I Group II 
Rating Scale Percentage of Percentage of 
Categories Statements Statements 
9 55 10 
8 20 12 
7 15 10 
6 10 11 
5 0 17 
4 0 14 
3 0 10 
2 0 9 
1 0 7 
100 1. 100 i 
Figure 2. Hypothetical Distributions. Percentage 
of Statements Placed in Each of the 
Nine Rating Scale Categories for 
Group I and Group II 
The two groups may be compared graphically to describe the differ-
ences in the percentage of statements placed in each rating. scale cate• 
gory, as follows. 
50 Group I 




.,,,, -·- .... 
lo ,-- ...... -- ... - ~-·-----____ .., ...... _____ .... ---- .. --
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Rating Scale Categories 
Figure 3 •. Group I and Group II Distributions. Percent of Objec• 
tionable Statements Placed in Each of the Nine Rat• 
ing Scale Categories (Hypothetical Data) 
9 
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The above comments integrate the empirical and theoretical line of 
thought underlying phase three. The theoretical aspects pertain to the 
concept of contrast effects and their expected influence upon the ernpir-
ical outcome in general. However, specific predictions on the differ-
ential influence of contrast effects operating exclusively within the 
latitude of rejection, could not be confidently worked out at this 
point. Therefore, a descriptive, exploratory approach was taken in 
phase three. 
The overall aim of this phase was to describe the frequency with 
which each group, as a whole, used the nine rating scale categories, and 
to estimate any significant differences in the relative frequency with 
which certain rating categories were used by each group of subjects. 
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The two groups may be compared on each rating scale category to de• 
termine whether one group differed from the other in the proportion of 
statements placed in each category. 
Independent Variable. Rating Scale Category 
The independent variable was defined with nine levels, each level 
corresponding to one of the nine rating categories. 
Dependent Variable. Proportion of Statements 
The proportion of statements which a subject placed within a rating 
scale category was defined by the number of statements he placed within 
category "!",·divided by the total number of statements within that sub• 
ject's individual latitude of rejection. 
If a subject had a latitude of rejection with six statements and 
placed two of those statements in category nine, then for that subject 
the proportion of statements in category nine is 2/6. 
Rationale for Dependent Variable 
The proportion of objectionable statements that a subject placed in 
category "i", say category nine, reflects the relative frequency with 
which that category was used by this subject to evaluate his individual 
latitude of rejection. Any two subjects, regardless of the size of 
their individual latitudes of rejection, may be compared on the relative 
frequency with which they used a particular rating scale category in the 
evaluations of their separate latitudes of rejection. 
Each rating scale category may be examined to determine whether one 
group of subjects characteristically placed a greater proportion of 
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statements in it than the o~her group. 
Procedure 
Testing procedures for collecting data necessary to make the above 
comparisons have been described on pages 40-42. 
Statistical Design 
For each individual latitude of rejection, the proportion of objec-
th tionable statements placed in the i rating category was calculated. 
th For the 1 category, a comparison between Group I and Group II on the 
relative frequency with which each subject used .that rating scale cate• 
gory was conducted. The Wilcoxln Rank·Sum Test was used for each com• 




Compared to low•e$o•involved subjects, high-ego-involved subjects 
exhibited disproportionately large latitudes of rejection and small 
latitudes of noncommitment; p • .os. 
The proportion of objectionable to neutral statements was indexed 
by the term n • All subjects were dichotomized about the median 
n+m 
value, n • .46. All subjects were dichotomized according to their 
n.+m 
defined membership to either Group I or Group II. A 2 by 2 Chi Square 





A TEST OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HYPOTHESIS ONE 
USING A 2 BY'2 CHI SQUARE TEST 
n "> .46 n !: .46 Observed 








Hypothesis One may be ~ccepted at the .01 level of confidence. 
Compared with low-ego-involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects, 
the high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects exhibited dispro-
portionately large latitudes of rejection and small latitudes of non• 
commitment. 
Visual inspection of Table I above suggests a mirror image with 
approximately 75 percent of each group falling into predicted categories 
and 25 percent of each group falling into unpredicted categories. 
Although the Chi Square Test applied to Hypothesis One indicated a 
,· 
significant association between variables one and two, it did not assess 
the extent or magnitude of associa.tion between the two variables. The 
Goodman-Kruskel index of predictive association was calculated for this 
purpose. The index of predictive association defines the reduction of 
error in predicting levels of variable B, given information on variable 
A. Specifically, given information regarding a subject's attitude and 
level of involvement, with what degree of predictive accuracy can t'hat 
subject's pattern of latitudes be forecasted, i.e., the relative size 
of the latitude of rejection to the latitude of noncomrnitment. The in• 
dex of predictive association estimates this predictive relationship. 
The possible values of the index of predictive association range from 
zero to unity. It generally gives a conservative estimate of the magni• 
tude of association. The calculated index of predictive association for 
the body of data in Table I was .53. 
The precise meaning of this index value requires further clarifica-
tion. Given no information regarding the relationship between the two 
variables, the probability of correctly categorizing a randomly drawn 
subject was .50, since half of all subjects fell into one or the other 
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latitude category. Conversely, the probability of predictive error was 
.so. The observed index of predictive association indicates that Hy-
pothesis One reduced the probability of error by 53 percent, i.e., the 
probability of error was reduced to .23. Therefore, predictions based 
on Hypothesis One have a 77 percent probability of being correct. Mag• 
nitude of association has been specifically defined by a probability 
statement referring to predictive accuracy. 
Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis Two compared Group I with Group II on the amount of dif· 
ferentiation occurlng within individual latitudes of rejection •. It was 
hypothesized that high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects 
would exhibit less differentiation among graduated attitude statements 
within their individual latitudes of rejection than low-ego-involved, 
mildly pro-religious attitude subjects •. 
The degree of differentiation within each subject's latitude of re• 
jection was measured by the formula,~· Differentiation scores were 
N 
then grouped into two columns corresponding to Group I and Group II sub· 
jects •. The Wilcoxin Rank-Sum Test for identical populations, sensitive 
to unequal locations, was employed to make a directional, one-tailed 
statistical comparison •. 
Hypothesis Two may be accepted at the .005 level of confidence. 
Compared with subjects defined as low•ego•involed, mildly pro~religious, 
the high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects demonstrated less 
differentiation among graduated attitude statements within their indi• 
vidual latitudes of rejection. 
TABLE II 
A TEST OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HYPOTHESIS TWO 
USING THE WILCOXIN RANK-SUM TEST 
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Subjects Rank n Observed Probability for Mean Value 
Sum Wy Value Observed Wy Value DR 
7 
Group I 1855 36 1855 p ~ .005 .5007 
Group II 773 36 1.4577 
Regarding the data used in testing Hypothesis Two, there was some 
question of whether or not a large enough, and therefore reliable sample 
of a subject's rating behavior was obtained. If each group was homogen• 
eous 'in its composition of subjects,. and if the rating of attitude 
statements was reliable, then it would be that subjects within the same 
group would exhibit similar differentiation scores. If this were the 
case, the variance within both groups should be relatively small. A 
test for the homogeneity of variance between the two groups would serve 
as a check on the homogeneity of each group and the reliability of their 
rating behavior. The Wilcoxin Rank-Sum Test of Variability was used to 
to test for homogeneity of variance between the two groups. A two-tail· 
ed test at the .OS level was applied. 
For oc ~ .05, and n • 36, m • 36, the observed sum-of-rank values 
must fall within the critical limits of 1139 - 1489. It may be seen 
from Table III, below, that the observed sum-of-rank values were within 
these limits. Therefore, it may be concluded that there was no signifi• 
61 
cant difference between th~ variances of Group I and Group II. This 
finding lends support to the supposition that subject groups were homo-
geneous in their subject composition and that rating procedures provided 
reliable measurements. 
TABLE III 
A TEST FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE BETWEEN GROUP I AND GROUP II 
DIFFERENTIATION SCORES USING THE WILCOXIN 
RANK·SUM TEST OF VARIABILITY 
Subjects Rank n Observed Observed Probability 
Sum Wy Value Wx Value for Observed 
Wyand Wx Values 
Group I 1386 36 1386 
p ':> .os 
Group II 1242 36 1242 
Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis Three predicted that Group I and Group II would differ 
on the relative frequency with which each used rating scale category 
"i'' to evaluate statements within their· individual latitudes of rejec• 
tlon; oc • .os. 
The aim of Hypothesis Three was to identify which, if any of the 
nine rating scale categories were used more often by one group, compared 
to the other. 
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The relative frequency with which a subject used category "1" was 
indexed by the number of statements he placed in category "i", divided 
by the total number of statements within his own latitude of rejection. 
The relative frequency with which each subject used rating scale 
category one was tabulated. These scores were grouped into two columns 
corresponding to Group I and Group II. A between-group comparison fol-
lowed. This procedure was conducted on each of the nine rating scale 
categories. Altogether, these steps were equivalent to conducting tests 
of simple effects in a 2 by 9 design with repeated measures on subjects 
(Bradley, 1968). Table IV, below, summarizes a between-group comparison 
on each rating scale category. 
Table IV indicates a confirmation of Hypothesis Three on category 
nine. The between-group differences on the remaining eight rating cate• 
gories did not reach significance under the two-tailed test conditions 
of Hypothesis Three. It may be concluded that the relative frequency 
with which Group I and Group II subjects used rating scale category nine 
(extremely objectionabl~) to evaluate statements within their individual 
latitudes of rejection was significantly different; p 5: .005. 
Referring to the bottom row of Table IV, it may be seen that the 
Group I sum-of-rank value is less than the Group II sum-of-rank value. 
Due to ranking procedures there is an inverse relationship between sum• 
of-rank values and relative frequency. Specifically, the relative fre-
quency with which Group I subjects used category nine was greater than 
that of Group II. 
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TABIE IV 
A TEST OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HYPOTHESIS THREE 
USING A TWO•TAIIEO WILCOXIN RANK•SUM TEST 
Category Group I Group II *Observed **Observed Two•Tailed Test 
Wx Value Wy Value Probabilty for 
Observed Wx and 
Wy Values 
1 1301 1327 1301 1327 
2 1326.S 1301.5 1301.5 1326.5 
3 1442 1206 1206 1442 
4 1418 1210 1210 1418 
5 1443.5 1184.5 1184.5 1443.5 
6 1461 1167 1167 1461 
41!. 
p • .10 
7 1203.5 1424.5 1203.5 1424.5 
8 1331.5 1296.5 1296.5 1331.5 
9 829 1799 829 1799 p$ .oos 
* Wx • Smaller Sum of Ranks 
'** Wy • Larger Sum of Ranks 
Post Hoc Comparisons 
Inspection of Table IV suggested the following post hoc, direction• 
al hypothesis. The relative frequency with which low•ego•involved sub• 
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jects used category six was greater than that of high•ego•involved sub• 






THE WILCOXm RANK-SUM TEST OF THE HYPOTHESIS THAT 
GROUP II USED RATING CATEGORY SIX WITH GREATER 
RELATIVE FREQUENCY THAN GROUP. I 
Rank•Sum n Observed Observed One•Tail Test 
Critical Wx Value Wy Value Probabiltty for 
Value Observed Wx Value 
1461 36 1461 
1167 36 1167 p ~ .os 
Results supported the hypothesis that low•ego•involved subjects 
used rating category six with greater relative frequency than high•ego• 
involved subjects, at the .os level of confidence. 
Compared to low•ego•involved subjects, high•ego•involved subjects 
used rating category nine with greater relative frequency and used cat• 
egory six with less relative frequency. These findings suggested the 
possibility of an interaction between groups and rating scale categor• 
ies. 
To test the hypothesis of a significant interaction between groups 
and categories, a multivariate extension of Friedman's one•way analysis 
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using repeated measures was employed (Bradley, 1968, P• 138). This 
design ts analogous to a 2 by 9 factorial with repeated measues on one 
factor. Table VI below summarizes only the test of the hypothesis that 
there was a significant interaction between groups and rating scale cat• 
egories. The level of significance was set at the .os level. 
TABLE VI 
A MULTIVARIATE EXTENSION OF FRIEDMAN'S ONE•WAY ANALYSIS 
TO TEST THE HYPOTHESIS OF A SIGNIFICANT INTERACTION 
BETWEEN GROUPS ANO RATING SCALE CATEGORIES 
d.f. S Value P Value 
Groups 1 
Categories 8 
Groups X Categories 8 12745.25 59.00 p ~ .oos 
The post hoc test for a significant interaction between groups and 
rating scale categories was supported at the .005 level of confidence. 
It may be concluded that the profile, or response surface over the nine 
rating categories was significantly different for the two groups. 
These post hoc results suggested the presence of a significant in• 
teractlon between groups and rating scale categories which may be partly 
described by intersecting profiles. 
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The following figure summarizes the relative frequency with which 
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Figure 4. Percent of Objectionable Statements Placed in Each of the 
Nine Rating Scale Categories by Group I and Group II 
It may be observed in Figure 4 that Group I subjects placed 46 per• 
cent of all objectionable statements falling within their latitudes of 
rejection into category nine, while Group II subjects placed only 14 
percent of such statements into category nine. This represented the 
most outstanding difference between the two groups of subjects in this 
phase of study. 
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Regarding the possibility for "piling•up effects," the post-test 
inquiry found only one subject who indicated that the number of avail• 
able categories was too few, and consequently confined him to an un• 
avoidable repetition of certain rating categories. In fact, this sub• 
ject was a member of Group II. In view of this general outcome, the 




There were two features of the psychosocial scale that potentially 
worked against the presence of assimilation-contrast effects in this 
study. The 12 attitude statements defining the psychosocial scale were 
chosen to represent equal interval attitude positions, ranging from one 
polar extreme to its opposite. Previous studies remain open to the cri• 
t~cism that assimilation or contrast effects might be artifacts of spac• 
ing some statements closer together than others. 
Perhaps a more poignant feature, which differs from earlier studies 
(Retch & Sherif, 1~63; Powell, 1966), was that mtd•scale attitude state• 
ments were not selected for their ambiguity. Sherif & Sherif (1969) 
described asaimllatlon•contrast effects as a systematic displacement of 
mid-scale, ambiguous stimuli either toward or away from the "own post• 
tion•" Ambiguity of a mid-scale item lends itself to a more subjective 
restructuring of its meaning; thus assimilation-contrast effects become 
heightened. Powell (1966) legitimately used statements from Thurstone 
and Chave•s (1929) research that had been deleted from the final atti• 
tude scale because of their ambiguity. 
The findings throughout this study, particularly those in Phase 
Two, should be taken as results generated from a psychosocial scale 
consisting of non-ambiguous and equal-appearing interval statements, as 
defined by Thurstone•s equal-appearing interval technique •. The presence 
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of assimilation-contrast effects under these conditions suggest the ap-
plicability of this model to relatively well-structured social judgment 
problems. 
Since a gestalt framework underlies the assimilation-contrast model 
a subject's response to a specific stimulus was given meaning in con-
text with a larger set, or family of stimuli. In general, this led to 
the use of proportions which specified a pattern or combination of re• 
sponses to be measured. 
Hypothesis One incorporated the proportion n , which indexed a 
n+m 
combination of responses to be jointly measured. Specifically, a given 
subject defined as high-ego-involved should display a combination of re-
sponses such that his individual latitude of rejection would be larger 
than his individual latitude of noncommitment. Conversely, a subject 
defined as low-ego-involved should display a configuration of respon~es 
representing an individual latitude of noncommltment that was equal to, 
or somewhat larger than his own latitude of rejection. Support of Hypo• 
thesis One at the .01 level of confidence indicates that the predicted 
pattern of responses, per individual group member, was obtained. 
The strength of association between level of ego-involvement and 
latitude pattern was estimated, using Kruskal & Goodman's index of pre-
dictive association. This statistic defines magnitude of association in 
terms of the probability with which Hypothesis One yields correct pre-
dictions. This probability was .77, which may be read as follows. On 
the average, predictions based on Hypothesis One should be accurate 77 
percent of the time. This statistical approach provided a specific 
statement on predictive accuracy which has been absent in prior study 
of these variables. 
70 
Two points were drawn from the above approach. A close alliance 
with the gestalt principles of idiographic, configural data was obtain• 
ed. Second, support for the association between levels of ego-involve• 
ment and latitude size using a different measurement technique, subject 
population and stimulus domain approximated what Lyken (1969) referred 
to as a constructive replication, i.e., the reliable association between 
variables does not depend on a strict methodological replication. 
Phase Two of this study investigated the amount of differentiation 
occurring within the latitude of rejection, as a function of attitude 
position and ego-involvement with the stimulus domain. Measuring the 
amount of differentiation made among graduated attitude statements with• 
in the latitude of rejection was kept at an idiographic and configural 
level, i.e., the number of statements that a subject included within his 
self-selected latitude of rejection was related to the number of rating 
scale categories he chose to evaluate these statements, as well as the 
range of rating scale categories he employed. Combinations of these 
three variables were jointly measured by the ratio~. This ratio 
N 
indexed the amount of differentiation displayed, per subject. 
The confirmation of Hypothesis Two (p ~ .oos) indicated that high• 
ego-involved subjects exhibited a marked display of dedifferentiation 
among those graduated attitude statements defining their individual lat• 
itudes of rejection. Low-ego-involved subjects retained a high degree 
of distinctiveness among graduated attitude statements defining their 
self-selected latitudes of rejection. 
An inspection of the data clearly indicated that high•ego•involved 
subjects judged "intermediate" statements to be as objectionable as the 
more extreme statements of the psychosocial scale. Clusters of state• 
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ments were placed into a few end categories. It was concluded from 
these findings that subjects highly ego•involved with the stimulus do• 
main and _who subscribed to a comparatively extreme attitude position 
generally failed to distinguish among attitude positions included within 
their latitude of rejection. 
Phase three of this study attempted to identify which of the nine 
rating scale categories were used more frequent~y by one group, compared 
to the other group, to evaluate statements within their individual lati• 
tudes of rejection. A between-group comparison on each of the nine rat• 
ing scale categories was conducted. 
It was found that the two groups differed significantly on the rel• 
ative frequency with which each used rating category nine; p ~ .oos. 
Category nine represented the most objectionable rating category and was 
denoted by the evaluative label, "Extremely Objectionable." Virtually 
100 percent of the high•ego•involved subjects used rating category nine; 
and this group placed approximately half (47 percent) of all objection• 
able statements into this one, extreme category. By contrast, 41 per• 
cent of the low-ego-involved group used category nine; and this group 
placed only 14 percent of all objectionable statements into this cate• 
gory. 
No other differences, per rating category, reached significance 
under the two-tailed test conditions specified under Hypothesis Three. 
An inspection of the data suggested a post hoc, one-tailed test of 
the following hypothesis. The relative frequency with which low•ego• 
involved subjects used category six was greater than that of high•ego• 
involved subjects. This prediction was supported at the .05 level of 
confidence. 
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Subsequent to the finding that hlgh•ego•lnvolved subjects used cat• 
egory nine with greater frequency and category.six with less frequency 
than low-ego-involved subjects, a post hoc test for interaction effects 
was conducted. 
The hypothesis of a significant interaction between groups and rat• 
Ing scale categories was supported at the .005 level of confidence. 
It was concluded on the basis of these findings that a significant 
interaction consisting of intersecting response profiles was present. 
This conclusion offers theoretical information regarding the display of 
contrast effects by each group. It was observed in Figure 4 that the 
distribution of statements over the nine rating categories by hlgh•ego• 
involved subjects was notably skewed, with an increasing percentage of 
statements placed toward the more objectionable rating categories of the 
scale. Marked contrast effects were inferred from this highly skewed 
response profile. Low-ego•involved subjects displayed a more limited 
and restrained tendency toward a skewed profile. 
The significant interaction between groups and categories contra• 
indicates the interpretation that contrast effects exhibited by low-ego• 
involved subjects were a milder version of contrast effects exhibited by 
hlgh•ego•involved subjects. The significant interaction indicates that 
the shape of the distribution of statements over the nine rating cate• 
gories was significantly different for the two groups (p ~ .oos). The 
simplest interpretation would seem to be that low•ego•involved subjects 
displayed mild contrast effects which dld not parallel the display of 
contrast effects exhibited by high-ego-involved subjects. In this re• 
spect, it might be speculated that the above difference was qualitative 
as well as quantitative. A more specific interpretation of this point 
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was not suggested by the data. 
The significance of this study rests upon its general application 
to a variety of social judgment situations that include people who dif• 
fer in terms of attitude position and level of ego-involvement. For 
example, in the area of industrial psychology a positive relationship 
between production level and employee morale has been found. In part, 
employee morale depends upon a supervisor's willingness to acknowledge 
the possible value of ideas which differ from accepted practice (Maier, 
1955). Let it be hypothesized for a given stimulus domain, that a su• 
pervisor•s receptivity is limited by the relative size of his latitude 
of rejection and latitude of noncommitment. This hypothesis seems rea• 
sonable in view of Tittler's (1967) study wherin subjects exhibiting 
comparatively narrow latitudes of noncommitment were least amenable to 
attitude change. 
Given the above, a method for defining the autocratic supervisor 
may be suggested. A supervisor exhibiting disproportionately large' lat• 
itudes of rejection and small latitudes of noncommitment on job-relevant 
stimulus domains provides a measurable definition of the autocratic 
group leader. An autocratic supervisor defined in this way should ex• 
hibit black or white judgment patterns, since statements outside his 
latitude of acceptance are dedifferentiated and contrasted into extreme• 
ly objectionable categories. To the extent that job security depends 
upon being acceptable to such a supervisor, a suppression of statements 
outside the supervisor's latitude of acceptance should follow. The re-
sulting effect would be the absence of employee contribution, involve~ 
ment, and morale. 
This method for defining the autocratic group leader is actually a 
74 
method for defining autocratic judgment on a specific attitude dimen• 
sion. As such, this method ls regarded as more specific and differen• 
tiated than a stereotyped characterization based on descriptive adjeC• 
tives. 
From this perspective, let the democratic leader be operationally 
defined as a low-ego-involved, mildly pro-attitude subject who exhibits 
a latitude of noncommitment that is equal to, or somewhat larger than 
his latitude of rejection, for a given attitude dimension. Correspond• 
ingly, let it be assumed that such a subject is receptive to a broader 
range of attitude statements that lie outside his latitude of acceptance 
because of his comparatively broad latitude of noncommitment and narrow 
latitude of rejection. In addition, dedifferentiation and marked con• 
trast effects do not occur in response to objectionable attitude state• 
ments made by others. 
Some comment regarding the laisse faire leader is in order. It is 
assumed here that the laisse faire leader should not be classified as a 
group leader in a psychosocial sense, but only in terms of a delegated 
label. This view is taken sinse the laisse faire leader does not seem 
to initiate goal-oriented interaction or decision-making; nor does he 
seem to apply positive or negative social sanctions in cases of non• 
participation and non-compliance.· He does not seem to accept or inl· 
tlate reciprocal role expectations implying that he somehow regulate 
group processes. Granted, this is a biased viewpoint, but in the ab• 
sence of these rudimentary conditions it seems_unnecessary to consider 
him a group leader in a psychosocial sense. Notwithstanding, it would 
be expected that such a person would be low-ego-involved, and exhibit 
an unusually broad latitude of noncommltment and narrow latitude of re• 
75 
jection. For example, subject eight of the low-ego-involved group (see 
Appendix A) exhibited a latitude of noncommitment containing eight of 
the twelve attitude positions. His latitude of rejection contained only 
two attitude positions, one at each polar extreme. It would seem rea-
sonable to assume that such a subject found in a leadership role would 
tolerate an inordinant range of different attitude positions. In terms 
of applying positive and negative sanctions that mold and define group 
norms, this subject would seem indefinite. 
From this approach, certain conclusions follow. A given supervisor 
may exhibit autocratic judgment on some stimulus dimensions, but not 
others. This does not exclude the possibility that a supervisor may be 
autocratic, in the sense used here, on all relevant stimulus dimensions. 
Conversely, this approach provides for the realistic possibility that 
a democratic leader may sometimes exhibit autocratic judgment, or at 
least express strong objection to statements that fall toward the outer 
limits of his own latitude of rejection. This latter behavior may occur 
on attitude dimensions for which he is characteristically described as 
democratic. 
In a manner of speaking, this application introduces a note of com-
mon sense regarding leader "types." It challenges the implication of 
categorical types without regard for the attitude dimensions involved. 
A measurable continuum that allows for extreme cases is suggested, rath-
er than a model of discreet, discontinuous leader types. 
Perhaps a more immediate question that remains unanswered and 
which underlies the above speculation is whether or not a subject's lat·-
itudes of acceptance, noncommitment, and rejection are correlated with 
reward and punishment behavior. It would be expected that a subject 
76 
rewards others for statements that fall within his latitude of accep-
tance, expresses neither behavior toward statements falling within his 
latitude of noncommitment, and punishes others for statements that fall 
within his latitude of rejection. 
If these expectations were confirmed, and then combined with the 
findings of this study a number of useful applications emerge. Consider 
the clinical problems of counselling two people who are about to be 
married. Take the attitude dimension of cleanliness, which would seem 
particularly easy to scale. If the prospective husband may be defined 
as a low-ego-involved, mildly pro-cleanliness attitude person while the 
prospective wife is defined as a high-ego-involved, pro-cleanliness per-
son, then certain predictions become immediately apparent. For example, 
the wife will behave punitively.toward her spouse for behavior that the 
husband judges to be either acceptable or of no consequence. By the 
husband's reference scale, his wife's punishment, probably verbal crit• 
icism, will seem unduly frequent (broad latitude of rejection and nar-
row latitude of noncommitment), and extreme (contrast effects); ad_!!!.~ 
finitum. In contrast to projective tests, this approach easily delin• 
eates a specific area of marital conflict. 
There is one other application of this study that seems quite spec-
ulative, yet amenable to empirical study. It pertains to the psycho-
analytic model of neurosis and the construct of the superego. 
Freud (1936) had subdivided the superego into two agencies, the 
censor and the ego-ideal. The censor was described as prohibitive and 
punitive, while the ego-ideal represented behavior, feelings, and be-
liefs that were acceptable. The analogy seems straightforward. The 
latitude of acceptance measures the limits of the ego-ideal and the 
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latitude of rejection measures the province of the censor, for a given 
attitude domain. 
From this perspective, neurotic areas of functioning may be defined 
by attitude dimensions on which a person may be described as a high•ego• 
involved, extreme attitude position subject. An unrealistic ego-ideal 
may refer to an extreme "own attitude position," around which the lati• 
tude of acceptance is located. A prohibitive and punitive censor may 
refer to a disproportionately large latitude of rejection in which de· 
differentiation and marked contrast effects occur. 
For example, on a psychosocial attitude scale of aggression, it 
would be predicted that a "neurotically inhibited" subject would locate 
his "own attitude position" near the extreme, anti-aggression pole, and 
exhibit a disproportionately large latitude of rejection relative to the 
size of his latitude of noncommitment. Psychoanalytically, such a re• 
sponse profile would represent the manifestation of an unrealistic ego• 
ideal and prohibitive censor. 
On the basis of this study, this subject should fail to differen-
tiate among various pro-aggression attitude positions and judge many of 
those positions to be extremely objectionable to him. Very few items on 
the aggression scale would fall into his narrow latitude of noncotl'l!lit• 
ment. Relative to others, this subject might be described as inhibited 
and unable to accept what other judge to be appropriate attitudes re• 
gardlng aggression. Psychoanalytically, this subject might be said to 
display a hyper•cathected superego manifested by the inhibition of nor• 
mal aggression. This kind of diagnostic synopsis often underlies the 
label, neurotic. 
For those psychologists who prefer to use such constructs as the 
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superego, censor and ego•ideal, but wish they were amenable to empirical 
study, this scheme offers such a method by operationally defining the 
ego-ideal by the latitude of acceptance and the censor by the latitude 
of rejection. The prohibitive and punitive character of the neurotic 
superego, specifically, the censor, may be partly understood in terms of 
a disproportionately large latitude of rejection, dedifferentiation, and 
marked contrast effects. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
The assimilation-contrast model of social judgment provided the 
theoretical and empirical background for this study. Specific focus was 
upon judgment patterns exhibited within the latitude of rejection. 
One group defined as high-ego-involved, pro-religious attitude sub-
. . 
jects, and a second group defined as low-ego-involved, mildly pro-reli-
gious attitude subjects were administered a bipolar scale of 12 reli· 
gious attitude statements. 
Hypothesis One predicted that high-ego-involved, pro-religious at-
titude subjects would exhibit disproportionately large latitudes of re• 
jection and small latitudes of noncommitment, compared to low-ego•fn• 
volved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects. Using a different mea• 
surement procedure from earlier studies, this relationship was supported 
at the .01 level of confidence. 
Hypothesis Two stipulated the following. Compared to low-ego-in-
volved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects, high-ego-involved, pro• 
religious attitude subjects would exhibit greater conceptual dedifferen• 
tiation within their individual latitudes of rejection. 
To test this hypothesis, statements defining an individual's lati-
tude of rejection were presented to the subject for further evaluation. 
Each of these objectionable statements were further judged on a nine• 
point rating scale labeled, ''Slightly Objectionable" and "Extremely 
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Objectionable" at either end. These rating scale evaluations were then 
organized into three related variables: number of different rating cat• 
egories used, denoted by the symbol, D; range of rating scale categories 
employed, R; and number of statements evaluated, N. DR The index, -:T"", 
N 
placed these characteristics of a subject's judgment pattern into rela• 
tionship with each other. The index,.!}-, operationally defined the 
N 
degree of differentiation made among graduated attitude positions within 
a subject's self-selected latitude of rejection regardless of its size 
or location. Compared to the low•ego•involved, mildly pro-religious 
attitude subjects, high•ego-involved, pro-religious attitude subjects 
did exhibit a significantly greater degree of conceptual dedifferentia• 
tion among graduated attitude statements within their individual lati• 
tudes of rejection; p ~ .oos. 
Hypothesis Three stipulated a between-group comparison on each rat• 
ing scale category, i.e., the relative frequency with which Group I and 
Group II used rating scale category "1'1 to evaluate statements within 
their respective latitudes of rejection was significantly different. 
Under the two-tailed test conditions of Hypothesis Three, the only 
rating category in which the two groups differed significantly was cat• 
egory nine. The relative frequency with which the high-ego-involved 
~roup used category nine was significantly greater than that of the low-
ego-involved group; p ~ .oos. Category nine was denoted by the evalua-
tive label "Extremely Objectionable" and represented the most negative-
ly weighted category of the rating scale. Low-ego-involved subjects 
placed only 14 percent of all objectionable statements into category 
nine, while high-ego-involved subjects placed almost half (47 percent) 
of all objectionable statements into category nine. 100 percent of 
81 
the high-ego-involved group used category nine to judge statements with• 
in.their latitude of rej~ction, while only 41 percent of the low-ego-
involved_ group applied this extreme category to statements within 
their latitude of rejection. 
Since the distribution of objectionable statements over the nine 
categories for the high-ego-involved group was highly skewed, with an 
increasing percentage of statements being placed toward the more nega• 
tively weighted end of the rating scale, the presence of marked contra~~ 
effects operating within the latitude of rejection was inferred. Post 
hoc tests indicated a significant interaction between groups and rating 
sc~le categories; p ~ .oos. This suggested that within the latitude of 
rejection the pattern of contrast effects displayed by each group was 
not parallel. 
The results of this study support the following conclusions. Com• 
pared to low-ego•involved, mildly pro-religious attitude subjects, 
high•ego•involved, pro-religious attitude subjects may be described by 
a tendency to dichotomize the psychosocial scale, to dedifferentiate 
those attitude positions falling within their disproportionately large 
latitude of rejection, and to ascribe a greater degree of objection to 
such eventso 
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APPENDIX A 
Own Attitude Position, and the Size of the 
Latitude of Noncommitment and 
Rejection, Per Subject 
Group I Group II 
Most Lat. Lat. Most Lat. Lat. 
Accept. of of Accept. of of 
Statement Noncom. Reject. Statement Noncom. Reject. 
1 2 '6 6 7 3 
1 0 9 7 6 3 
1 4 5 7 4 3 
2 3 5 7 3 2 
2 4 4 6 s 3 
2 2 7 7 4 4 
1 3 6 7 3 6 
2 0 8 7 8 2 
1 1 9 7 5 2 
1 3 5 7 s 3 
2 1 6 s 5 4 
2 5 5 6 2 4 
2 3 6 6 6 3 
2 4 4 6 2 5 
2 5 4 6 s 4 
2 7 3 7 4 4 
2 1 7 7 4 2 
2 6 4 6 5 3 
1 3 4 7 4 2 
2 3 4 7 7 2 
3 4 5 7 5 2 
2 1 6 8 5 3 
1 5 5 6 3 4 
2 4 4 s 4 4 
1 3 s 6 5 3 
2 4 3 5 s 5 
1 .5 4 6 4 3 
2 4 4 7 s 4 
2 3 4 6 5 3 
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2 0 8 7 7 ·3 
1 5 4 7 7 2 
1 3 5 5 7 4 
1 0 8 7 5 3 
2 2 7 5 6 3 
2 0 9 7 6 3 
2 5 4 7 s 5 
Totals 108 198 Totals 178 118 
APPENDIX B 
Differentiation Scores per Subject 
Group I Group II 
N D R DR N D R DR 
7 7 
4 4 6 1.5000 2 2 7 3.5000 
7 7 9 1.4897 3 3 7 2.3333 
3 3 4 1.3333 3 3 7 2.3333 
6 6 7 1.1667 4 4 8 2.0000 
9 9 9 1.0000 2 2 4 2.0000 
4 4 4 1.0000 4 4 8 2.0000 
7 6 8 .9795 3 3 6 2.0000 
4 3 5 .9375 4 4 8 2.0000 
4 3 5 .9375 4· 4 7 1.7500 
8 6 8 .7500 3 3 5 1.6666 
5 2 9 .7200 3 3 5 1.6666 
5 3 5 .6000 3 3 s 1.6666 
4 2 4 .sooo 3 3 5 1.6666 
6 3 6 .5000 2 2 3 1.5000 
5 3 4 .4800 2 2 3 1.5000 
5 3 4 .4800 3 3 4 1.3333 
3 2 2 .4444 3 3 4 1.3333 
8 4 7 .4375 3 3 4 1.3333 
4 2 3 .3750 3 3 4 1.3333 
5 3 3 .3600 3 3 4 1.3333 
5 3 3 03600 3 3 4 1.3333 
5 3 3 .3600 4 4 5 1.2500 
9 3 9 .3333 4 4 5 1.2500 
7 2 7 .2857 4 4 5 1.2500 
6 3 3 .2500 4 4 5 1.2500 
4 2 2 .2500 6 5 8 1.1111 
6 3 3 .2500 5 3 9 1.oaoo 
4 2 2 .2500 2 2 2 1.0000 
4 2 2 .2500 3 3 3 1.0000 
4 2 2 .2500 2 2 2 1.0000 
9 4 4 .1999 3 3 3 1.0000 
5 2 2 .1600 2 2 2 1.0000 
8 2 3 .0937 5 4 6 .9600 




















Number of Statements and Percent of Statements 
Placed in Each of the Nine Rating Seale 
Categories by Group I and Group II 
Categories Group I Group II 
Number Percent Number Percent 
of of of of 
Statements Statements Statements Statements 
1 - 5 2.5 4 3.3 
2 5 2.s 5 4.2 
3 4 2.0 9 7.6 
4 4 2.0 9 7.6 
5 11 5.5 15 12.7 
6 14 7.4 16 13.8 
7 29 14.6 22 18.6 
8 34 17.1 21 17.8 
9 92 46.4 17 14.4 
Totals 198 100.0 118 100.0 
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